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Agenda item 33
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 20 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, dated 19 August 2015, regarding the latest illegal military activities of the Russian Federation in Georgia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 33, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kaha **Imnadze**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 20 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia regarding the latest illegal military activities of the Russian Federation in Georgia

Tbilisi, 19 August 2015

On 17 August 2015, the Russian Federation launched large-scale military exercises involving its military bases in the southern military district and the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia, which remain under illegal Russian military occupation. Based on the official website of the Russian Defence Ministry, these exercises envisage the use of modern weapon systems such as the Grad-M, Uragan and Smerch multiple-launch rocket systems, the 152-mm and 122-mm self-propelled howitzers Msta-C and D-30, and the self-propelled artillery piece Nona. The exercises are scheduled to continue until 18 September.

Today, the Russian armed forces of the southern military district that are deployed in the North Caucasus and in the occupied Tskhinvali region of Georgia started field exercises using new-generation communications systems. The field exercises currently involve more than 2,000 troops and over 500 pieces of special communications equipment.

In parallel to its military exercises, Russia continues to violate the airspace of Georgia. In particular, on 19 August, at 10.57 a.m., a Russian military MI-8 helicopter entered the airspace of Georgia beyond the occupied territory, from the occupied Khelchua village, and flew over Zardiaantkari village in Gori municipality. After violating Georgian airspace, the helicopter continued towards the occupied town of Akhalgori.

Such actions by the Russian Federation are of a provocative character, and they pose a threat to the peace and stability of the region. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia demands that the Russian Federation comply with the fundamental principles of international law, as well as with the international commitments undertaken by Russia, including under the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, and withdraw all its military forces from the occupied Georgian territories.

At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia calls upon the international community, in particular the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia and the co-chairs of the Geneva international discussions, to duly assess the activities of Russia directed against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia.

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General Assembly

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Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 124
Global health and foreign policy

Letter dated 1 September 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly

1. The present letter on the work of the United Nations in response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa covers developments from 1 to 31 July 2015, the 300-day mark since the establishment of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER). It records activities carried out by my Special Envoy on Ebola and UNMEER and provides an update on progress made in the Ebola response pursuant to General Assembly resolution 69/1 since my letter of 24 July 2015 (A/69/992).

Way forward

2. The people and nations affected by Ebola looked to the United Nations system for support and assistance in the face of the outbreak. A number of United Nations system entities have offered sustained support in responding to the outbreak, supporting the restoration of essential services and recovery efforts and building preparedness in the region. They have done so under the stewardship of national leaders, engaging with local communities and supporting local and national response efforts. They have coordinated closely with national and international non-governmental organizations, regional organizations and the assistance, operations and medical teams deployed by foreign Governments.

3. On 17 September 2014, at the height of the Ebola crisis, I wrote to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, indicating that I intended to establish the first-ever United Nations emergency health mission to harness the capabilities of all the relevant United Nations actors under one crisis management system to reinforce unity of purpose among responders and to ensure a rapid and effective response to the crisis (see A/69/389-S/2014/679). My decision, which followed a joint request from the Presidents of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone for the United Nations to coordinate international support to nationally led response efforts, was heralded by the international community. UNMEER was established on 19 September 2014 following the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 69/1.

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4. I also indicated that the Mission would be a temporary measure, existing only as long as was necessary to stem the crisis. I wrote that, when Ebola no longer posed a grave threat to the people of the infected countries, the Mission would have achieved its objective and would be disbanded. As a temporary entity, UNMEER was not created to replace or supplant any operational actor on the ground. Rather, with many United Nations operational actors active in the affected countries since the onset of the outbreak, the establishment of UNMEER was intended to respond to the growing severity of the emergency by enhancing the efforts of responders through the establishment of a crisis management system. That system would help United Nations entities to align their efforts, work in synergy and scale up effective action in support of the affected populations through a single and unified response.

5. By design, UNMEER combined the technical expertise of the World Health Organization (WHO) with the operational and coordination capabilities of other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and relevant United Nations entities, working with host Governments, the United Nations system and other national and international stakeholders to put in place the lines of action essential to containing and stopping the outbreak. Considerable progress in the effort to bring the outbreak under control and to scale up national and international response capacity has been made, as reflected by the recent case numbers.

6. It is in this context that, on 31 July, I announced the closure of UNMEER, thereby marking an important milestone in the global Ebola response. The Mission had contributed to scaling up the response in the affected countries and established focused coordination of responders, thus fulfilling its core objectives. On 1 August, oversight of the United Nations system's Ebola emergency response was fully transferred from UNMEER to WHO, under the direct authority of the WHO Director General. The transition to WHO management was informed by an assessment of the progress made to date, taking into account the evolving nature of the emergency operation from a large-scale logistical effort to a targeted public health effort. The response continues to require a high level of intensified inter-agency collaboration and support for Governments in order to end the outbreak. WHO will coordinate all efforts necessary to meet that objective.

7. To maintain the high-level, dedicated United Nations leadership needed to reach zero cases, I determined that the Ebola crisis managers would remain in the affected countries beyond the Mission's lifespan under the oversight of WHO, with the support of the resident coordinators and United Nations country teams, until the end of December 2015 and possibly beyond, subject to a reassessment of exigencies on the ground. In Liberia, my Deputy Special Representative for Recovery and Governance for Liberia and Resident Coordinator, with the support of the United Nations country team and the United Nations Mission in Liberia, will provide the high-level United Nations leadership for the Ebola emergency response.

8. Over the past five months since I began to signal the eventual transition of UNMEER as the situation on the ground progressively improved, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Mission in Liberia and national and international partners have undertaken the operational functions, such as logistics, field crisis management and information management, necessary to enable a seamless transition. Planning began in earnest more than five months ago to support a transition that would enable national and international partners, including United

Nations system entities, to scale up their presence and capacity on the ground and mobilize the resources necessary to support a transition that would leave no gaps behind. The methodological planning process undertaken to facilitate the transition and the corresponding scale-up of national capacity and partner support, thereby enabling UNMEER to wind down, cement the legacy of the United Nations system working as one in responding to an unprecedented crisis. I extend my gratitude to the key national response actors who supported the transition. I also recognize and commend the United Nations principals for their personal engagement and leadership in ensuring the full support of their respective entities throughout the response to date and for continuing to stay the course to reach zero cases.

9. The next phase of the response, led by WHO, will be two-pronged and focused on, first, defining and rapidly interrupting all remaining chains of transmission and, second, identifying and managing the remaining risks in all previously affected locations. The sustained engagement of communities will remain an integral component of both facets. The United Nations system, with the strategic advocacy and resource mobilization support of my Special Envoy and under the oversight of WHO, will continue to encourage unity of purpose among all Ebola response partners until transmission has been interrupted throughout the region. The efforts will also be closely coordinated with the resident coordinators and United Nations country teams in the affected countries, who will, in tandem, take the lead on system-wide coordination and management of recovery programmes.

10. July was a significant month in the drive to reach zero cases in West Africa. In Guinea and Sierra Leone, the last week of July saw the lowest case incidence since mid-2014. The geographical spread of the outbreak has now been greatly reduced. The vast majority of cases in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone can be epidemiologically linked to a known chain of transmission. In another positive development, WHO announced on 31 July that a vaccine trial in Guinea had yielded very promising results. While the vaccine has yet to be licensed or recommended outside clinical trial settings, once approved it will be an additional tool to combat the virus in the event of future outbreaks. In the meantime, all contacts and contacts of contacts of new cases in Guinea will henceforth be offered immediate vaccination. Discussions have been initiated regarding a possible expansion of the trial to Sierra Leone.

11. The recent progress notwithstanding, we cannot yet claim victory. There remain many high-risk contacts under follow-up in the three affected countries, while some are lost to follow-up and therefore cannot be offered vaccination. Nationally led response efforts continue to require focused support from the United Nations system, among other partners, backed by sustained financing from the international community, as they work towards ending the outbreak as swiftly as possible and sustaining the achievements made.

12. The United Nations remains steadfast in its commitment to supporting the Governments of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in reaching and staying at zero cases. I commend the Presidents of those countries for the stewardship that they have continued to provide to the global Ebola response effort. I am equally appreciative of the hospitality extended to the personnel who deployed with the United Nations in the affected countries. I also take the opportunity to thank and recognize all those personnel who deployed to the region amid fear and stigma for their service and dedication.

13. I wish to thank the partners and donors who continue to work hand in hand with the affected countries and the United Nations. The generous contributions pledged during the International Ebola Recovery Conference will prove essential in helping to redress the devastating impact of Ebola on health delivery and social services institutions in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

14. While we must continue to look ahead and persevere in support of nationally led response efforts to reach and stay at zero cases, we must also take the opportunity to look back and take stock of what we have collectively learned. We would be remiss if we did not avail ourselves of this opportunity to translate lessons learned from our response to the outbreak into supporting the need to ensure stronger national and international systems to prevent and respond effectively to future health crises and in improving our capacity, as a United Nations system, to respond to crises that fall outside the norm. The real tragedy would be if we came away from the crisis and failed to apply the lessons learned from our response to improving our crisis management capacity to respond to unorthodox crises that may occur.

15. That is why I commissioned a high-level panel on the global response to health crises, whose findings will be instrumental in strengthening national and international systems to prevent and manage future health crises. It recently completed its third series of meetings with visits to Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone and is due to report its findings to me by December.

16. Concurrently, a lessons-learned exercise dedicated to UNMEER is now under way. It will draw lessons from how the Mission functioned as a crisis management system to bring the entire United Nations system together to scale up the operational response to the Ebola outbreak with a view to also identifying lessons learned that are transferrable to non-health crises. The initial findings of the exercise will also inform the work of the High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises.

Current situation of the Ebola outbreak

17. As at 2 August, a total of 27,898 confirmed, probable and suspected cases of Ebola had been reported in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone and in seven previously affected countries (Italy, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Spain, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America). A cumulative total of 11,296 confirmed, probable and suspected deaths had been reported.

18. Between 29 June and 2 August, the weekly incidence decreased from 30 to 2 confirmed cases in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone combined, the lowest weekly total reported since early March 2014. In Guinea, the incidence fluctuated between 13 and 22 confirmed cases, followed by a steep decrease to 1 confirmed case in the week to 2 August. In Sierra Leone, the incidence increased to 14 confirmed cases in the week to 12 July, followed by a decrease to 1 confirmed case in the week to 2 August. In Liberia, while the outbreak re-emerged in Margibi and Montserrado counties with six confirmed cases reported in the two weeks to 12 July, no further cases have since been reported. Although the six cases belong to the same transmission chain, the source of infection remains under investigation.

19. The geographical area of active transmission has increased since June across Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, with 11 prefectures, counties and districts

reporting at least one confirmed case between 29 June and 2 August. Nevertheless, transmission is mostly centred around the capital cities of Guinea and Sierra Leone and in the Guinean prefecture of Forécariah. In Guinea, Conakry and the prefectures of Forécariah, Boké, Coyah and Fria accounted for 47, 36, 10, 5 and 2 per cent, respectively, of all confirmed cases during the same period. After more than two months without a case, the prefecture of Coyah reported three cases.

20. In Sierra Leone, Western Area Urban (including the capital, Freetown), Kambia, Port Loko and Tonkolili accounted for 57, 23, 13 and 7 per cent, respectively, of all confirmed cases from 29 June to 2 August; the other 10 districts reported no cases. Tonkolili reported a confirmed case on 24 July after more than four months without a case.

21. The epicentre of the initial outbreak, in the tri-border area around the Guinean prefecture of Guéckédou, the Liberian county of Lofa and the Sierra Leonean district of Kailahun, has not recorded a confirmed case for more than 210 days; it has been more than 150 days since the last confirmed case was reported from the Guinée Forestière region. All contacts in the Guinean prefecture of Boké, the location of a recent cluster of cases, have completed 21 days of follow-up, meaning that the risk of Ebola transmission to Guinea-Bissau has decreased.

Progress towards ending transmission

Overall assessment

22. Owing to the continued Ebola transmission and the week-to-week fluctuations in case incidence, all components of the Ebola response have remained active. The confirmation of six new cases in Liberia highlighted the serious possibility that the disease could reappear in areas previously classified as free of Ebola. Similarly, the re-emergence of cases in Liberia and other areas not recently affected, such as Tonkolili, emphasized the continuing need for heightened surveillance and vigilance and continued rapid response capacity.

Progress towards meeting key targets

23. Although Liberia has recorded no new Ebola cases since 12 July, efforts continue to ensure the detection of any eventual cases through enhanced follow-up of survivors and a strengthened national policy on systematic swabbing of corpses.

24. In Sierra Leone, Operation Northern Push was extended by 90 days to maintain the progress achieved since its launch on 16 June. The second phase of the operation, Operation Enduring Zero, is intended to further identify and contain Ebola and eradicate it from infected areas in Kambia, Port Loko and Western Area districts by employing strengthened surveillance, contact tracing and, when necessary, quarantine, supporting affected communities and strictly enforcing existing bylaws.

25. In Guinea, reinforced surveillance campaigns are continuing in communities with active transmission. In July, campaigns were launched in the prefectures of Boké and Conakry aimed at conducting active case finding in households over a 21-day period. The campaigns target individual households in active transmission areas of cities too large to be entirely confined. There are also campaigns involving the confinement of entire localities in smaller areas.

26. Across the three affected countries, contact tracing remains vital in understanding the chains of transmission and rapidly isolating contacts who present Ebola symptoms. In Guinea, between 29 June and 2 August, an average of 55 new contacts were registered per confirmed case, with 1,080 contacts under follow-up as at 2 August. Some 99 per cent of those contacts are being traced daily. In Sierra Leone, contacts are distributed across four districts, with 810 under follow-up as at 2 August. Some 99 per cent of those contacts are being traced daily, with an average of 12 newly registered contacts per confirmed case. Of the newly confirmed cases reported, 81 per cent arose from registered contacts in Guinea between 29 June and 2 August, compared with 70 per cent over the same period in Sierra Leone. As at 2 August, all contacts under follow-up in Margibi and Montserrado counties, Liberia, had completed the 21-day follow-up period.

27. In the context of declining case incidence, current treatment capacity far exceeds need. Accordingly, WHO has continued to advise the ministries of health and partners on the safe decommissioning of surplus Ebola treatment centres. Each country will retain a core capacity of high-quality centres strategically located to ensure complete geographic coverage, with additional rapid response capacity held in reserve. Nine core centres will be retained in Guinea, six in Liberia and ten in Sierra Leone. As facilities are decommissioned, district health facilities are being supported to safely assume responsibility for triage and isolation or referral of cases.

28. In July, four health-care workers were infected with Ebola in Guinea, three of whom in Conakry and one in Forécariah. Two were infected in Sierra Leone.

29. There is sufficient laboratory capacity in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone to meet existing needs. In July, the number of operational laboratories, coordinated by WHO, increased by one to 11 and 10 in Guinea and Sierra Leone, respectively, and remained at 3 in Liberia. In the five weeks to 2 August, 4,790 new and repeat samples were tested in Guinea, 4 per cent of which tested positive for Ebola. During the same period, 9,200 new samples were tested in Sierra Leone, of which fewer than 1 per cent tested positive. Of the 2,041 new and repeat samples tested in Liberia during the same period, 11 tested positive. In the five weeks to 2 August, the percentages of samples tested that were collected from dead bodies were 78, 52 and 77 per cent in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively.

30. Sporadic incidents in Guinea and Sierra Leone highlighted the need to continue to accord priority to community engagement as a critical component of the response strategy. The average number of prefectures that reported at least one security incident or other form of refusal to cooperate per week in Guinea decreased from four in June to three in July. In Sierra Leone, the number of districts reporting at least one incident of resistance remained constant at eight per week.

31. The sufficient capacity to conduct safe burials at the national level notwithstanding, 9 of the 30 deaths from Ebola reported in Guinea between 29 June and 2 August occurred in the community. Over the same period in Sierra Leone, 8 of the 19 deaths from Ebola occurred in the community. Unsafe burial practices continued to be of concern: 28 reports of unsafe burials were received by the WHO country office in Guinea between 28 June and 2 August, while rumours of illegal burial practices remained under investigation in Sierra Leone.

Update on the operational activities carried out by the United Nations system through the Mission and its partners

32. Throughout July, the support of the United Nations system and partners focused on Operation Northern Push in Sierra Leone, the reinforced surveillance campaigns in Guinea and efforts to investigate and stem the transmission of Ebola in areas in which it had re-emerged after several months without any cases. Households hosting identified Ebola contacts were restricted in their movements and provided with a full package of services to meet their immediate social needs for more than 21 days, including free medical care, food and non-food items and water, either by trucking or the installation of new water points. Infection prevention and control measures were intensified and extensive training provided in all affected areas, targeting in particular health-care workers and communities at risk.

United Nations partners

33. By the end of July, Médecins sans frontières had nearly 1,500 national staff and 100 international staff on the ground and four operational Ebola management centres. In Guinea, a new centre in Boké was opened early in July, while in Conakry the organization moved from the Donka hospital to a new facility in Nongo. In Sierra Leone, the organization's maternity Ebola management centre in Freetown also began to accept suspected and confirmed Ebola cases who were not pregnant. In Liberia, the organization is running a 69-bed paediatric hospital in Monrovia to support the restoration of the secondary health system and is also operating a clinic specifically for Ebola survivors.

34. In Guinea, the number of safe and dignified burials conducted by the Guinean Red Cross reached an all-time high in July, with 2,764 burials (an average of 700 per week). The increase followed the Government's extension of such burials to all deaths nationwide on 25 June. While the Guinean Red Cross is burying almost all persons whose deaths are reported, two thirds of expected deaths are going unreported, with a handful of deaths announced only after the burial has been conducted.

United Nations system

35. To date, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and partners have reached more than 4 million households with interpersonal communication skills training for Ebola prevention in the three affected countries. In Guinea, UNICEF continued to support social mobilization activities. In partnership with the National Scout Association of Guinea, social mobilization efforts targeted the border area with Guinea-Bissau, where 1,204 people benefited from awareness-raising activities.

36. To counter persistent rumours about Ebola that were deterring communities from reporting deaths, practising safe burials and participating in vaccination trials, UNICEF deployed 15 social anthropologists from Sonfonia University, Conakry, to the affected prefectures and in Conakry to gain a better understanding of and address concerns. In addition, as a first step in a large-scale project with the Ministry of Transportation, some 700 staff received training and subsequently checked the temperatures of 1.8 million passengers and ensured hand-washing

compliance at major traffic junctions in Conakry, including bus stations, railway stations and harbours.

37. In response to continuing transmission in the Kambia, Port Loko, Tonkolili and Western Area districts of Sierra Leone, UNICEF deployed 51 national and international community engagement and other technical specialists and an additional 3,200 social mobilizers. District-specific social mobilization and community engagement plans were prepared as part of Operation Northern Push in Kambia and Port Loko and Operation Safeguard in Western Area. In July, 1,811 traditional leaders, paramount and section chiefs and 509 traditional healers from Kambia and Port Loko were enlisted to spearhead community engagement activities in their communities. Ebola survivor task forces have been formed in all the hotspots in Western Area Urban and continue to provide community feedback on key Ebola prevention issues. There has been systematic engagement with ward councillors and ward task forces.

38. During the recent flare-up of Ebola cases in Margibi and Montserrado counties, Liberia, UNICEF provided assistance, including drinking water, infection prevention and control supplies, blankets and mattresses, tents for isolation, hand-washing buckets, chlorine and gloves, to contacts under voluntary isolation. It also provided health facilities with decontamination support, mobile toilets and emergency shower facilities with soakaways. Two schools were decontaminated and children provided with psychosocial support. Outreach activities to 3,120 households were undertaken. In addition, UNICEF provided support to set up an emergency operations centre and a holding centre in Margibi county and equipped responders with personal protective equipment.

39. Hygiene kits distributed in the context of outreach campaigns throughout the region have benefited more than 4 million people. UNICEF and water, sanitation and hygiene partners have provided almost 1,500 Ebola and non-Ebola health-care facilities with water, sanitation and hygiene facilities. Related activities included the rehabilitation or construction of 118 boreholes in Guinea and, in Sierra Leone, the construction of 256 household latrines in Kambia and Port Loko since the beginning of Operation Northern Push. In Liberia, UNICEF is supporting the rehabilitation of water, sanitation and hygiene facilities in 50 health-care facilities and assisting the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare to put in place standard guidelines for water, sanitation and hygiene in health facilities. More than 7,000 Ebola patients have received nutritional support from UNICEF and partners and some 2,000 Ebola-affected children have received ready-to-use infant formula.

40. To date, in excess of 18,000 children have been registered as having lost one or both parents, or their primary caregivers, to Ebola in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Of those children, more than 12,000 have been provided with a minimum package of support from UNICEF. Some 130,000 children have received psychosocial support. In those countries, UNICEF continues to support care centres for asymptomatic children who are high-risk contacts for Ebola cases. All children in quarantined households continued to receive follow-up visits, counselling and psychosocial support sessions facilitated by UNICEF and partners, including after they had been discharged.

41. In July, WHO had 864 national and international staff, including more than 318 epidemiologists, deployed in 68 locations in the three affected countries. It continued to coordinate and deploy international technical assistance through the

Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network. Currently, there are 63 experts deployed for critical response functions (32 in Guinea, 8 in Liberia, 21 in Sierra Leone and 2 at WHO headquarters). A further 65 experts are being deployed to the field. Since March 2014, WHO has deployed 872 experts from partner institutions and networks and mobilized 58 foreign medical teams from more than 40 partner organizations. In addition, 82 organizations have been involved in supporting foreign medical teams and Ebola treatment centres. WHO plans to sustain a large presence beyond the end of the outbreak to ensure sufficient surveillance capacity and to support the countries in their implementation of early recovery plans.

42. On 23 March, the Guinean authorities, WHO, Médecins sans frontières and the Norwegian Institute of Public Health, with support from a broad partnership of national and international organizations, began a phase three trial of the VSV-EBOV vaccine in affected communities to evaluate the efficacy, effectiveness and safety of a single dose.

43. A "ring" approach has been adopted. The premise is that, by vaccinating all people who have come into contact with an infected person, a protective "ring" is created that can stop the virus from spreading further. The strategy has helped the researchers to follow the dispersed epidemic in Guinea and will provide a way to continue that as a public health intervention in trial mode.

44. To date, more than 4,000 close contacts of almost 100 Ebola patients, including family members, neighbours and co-workers, have voluntarily participated in the trial. Randomization was halted on 26 July to allow for all people at risk to receive the vaccine immediately and to minimize the time necessary to gather more conclusive evidence needed for eventual licensure of the product. Until then, 50 per cent of the rings were being vaccinated three weeks after the detection of a case to provide a term of comparison with rings vaccinated immediately. The trial will now expand to include young people between 13 and 17 years of age and, possibly, children between 6 and 12 years of age on the basis of new evidence that the vaccine is safe. In parallel with the ring vaccination trial, researchers are conducting a trial of the same vaccine on front-line workers.

45. On 31 July, WHO and partners released the results of an interim analysis of the trial, which indicated that the vaccine was highly effective against Ebola. The independent body of international experts that conducted the review — the data and safety monitoring board — advised that the trial should continue. While the vaccine shows full efficacy in individuals to date, more conclusive evidence is needed regarding its capacity to protect populations through herd immunity. The Guinean national regulatory authority and ethics review committee have approved the continuation of the trial.

46. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has expanded land, air and sea border monitoring and screening in the three affected countries. It has provided infrastructure, screeners, training and supplies to the Government of Liberia following the detection of new cases, including refresher training on Ebola prevention and community preparedness for 90 general community health volunteers in Grand Bassa county. In addition, capacity-building for 105 health screeners to support border-reopening processes for counties bordering Côte d'Ivoire continued throughout July.

47. In Sierra Leone, IOM has added more than 150 new health screening monitors, roving motorcycle teams and data collectors at flow monitoring points on and around the border between Guinea and Sierra Leone in Bombali and Kambia districts and at key seaports in Freetown. Its teams are helping to collect vital headcount data, disaggregated by port of origin/destination and gender, among others, in support of surveillance and contact tracing efforts. IOM has also completed its training of more than 100 Sierra Leonean soldiers deployed to border crossings in Kambia district. The IOM-managed National Ebola Training Academy, in partnership with WHO, the College of Medicine and Allied Health Sciences, the Sierra Leonean armed forces and the Ministry of Health and Sanitation, has to date trained in excess of 8,400 health-care professionals and front-line responders in infection prevention and control, advanced health screening and clinical care.

48. In Liberia, payments by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) to 2,622 contact tracers in six counties enabled continued active case searching and alerts covering more than 40,000 households. Nine field focal points recruited by UNFPA continued to provide coordination and monitoring support for surveillance efforts in the six counties. In Guinea, UNFPA continued to support response efforts by providing solidarity kits to Ebola-affected populations and communication tools to support contact tracing efforts in the prefectures of Conakry and Forécariah.

49. In Sierra Leone, 1,240 enhanced contact tracers and 234 contact tracing supervisors are supported by UNFPA nationwide. UNFPA is providing further support to contact tracing efforts in the active transmission districts of Kambia, Port Loko, Tonkolili and Western Area. Seventy-seven additional contact tracers have been added to ensure swift mobilization in new hotspots.

50. As a result of the recent confirmed case in Tonkolili district, WHO is redeploying additional resources to ensure effective event monitoring and investigation with a view to enhancing the timeliness of responses to any subsequent cases.

51. WHO provided technical assistance to the technical working group on comprehensive care for Ebola survivors, which is led by the Ministry of Health and Sanitation and the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs. The working group coordinates with partners committed to the provision of medical and psychosocial services to Ebola survivors, maintains a secure registry of survivors and provides governance for proposed and current research involving survivors.

52. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs provided support to the newly recruited field coordinators in the hotspots of Port Loko, Kambia and Tonkolili by identifying solutions to coordination challenges in order to enable a more timely, predictable and cohesive response (see para. 60).

53. In July, the Office focused on continuing to provide surge support in Ebola hotspots in Guinea. Its field coordinators were deployed to Boké, Conakry and Forécariah to support detection campaigns and coordination among Ebola response actors. It initially provided supervisory support to the national detection and awareness-raising campaigns launched in Boké and Conakry in July, but subsequently withdrew its field presence in Boké, following 21 days with no new cases, and shifted its focus to Conakry. It is also working with WHO and partners to ensure the distribution of assistance packages to the some 1,300 highly vulnerable survivors of Ebola in Guinea.

54. In the light of the recent decrease in the geographic scope of operational and logistical demands, the World Food Programme (WFP) plans to progressively reduce the provision of logistical services from October. The WFP-led logistics and emergency telecommunications clusters are already coordinating with their respective partners to facilitate the transition and ensure a smooth handover of the services to commercial solutions. Nevertheless, WFP remains operationally equipped to promptly mobilize a response should new cases appear, as demonstrated by the rebuilding of six rapid isolation treatment kits in Liberia.

55. To date, the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service has transported some 21,810 passengers throughout the region. Its fleet currently consists of three fixed-wing aircraft and five helicopters, two of which are specially equipped for the medical evacuation of health and humanitarian personnel with Ebola-like symptoms.

56. The WFP-led emergency telecommunications cluster is providing Internet services to 80 humanitarian facilities in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, ensuring reliable Internet access for more than 2,100 humanitarian responders. WFP and the cluster continue to support the implementation of the WFP-WHO joint collaboration. In Liberia, all prefabricated structures and ablution units were delivered and set up. In Sierra Leone, Operation Northern Push led to an increase in activities in Kambia and Port Loko, increasing the number of staff and related office space, accommodation and fuel supply needs.

57. In Sierra Leone, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women distributed 180 solidarity kits, through which some 500 survivors and destitute families were able to gain access to basic services. UNDP also processed hazard payments for June and July for nearly 3,000 front-line Ebola health-care workers.

58. UNDP supported the construction of six isolation units for the most overcrowded detention facilities in Sierra Leone for use during the 21-day incubation period. In the post-Ebola phase, the units will be repurposed as rehabilitation facilities for inmates. UNDP has also helped to build the capacity of more than 200 corrections officers in infection prevention and control and distributed personal protective equipment to all 17 correctional centres nationwide. Since January 2015, 496 people have received legal aid services in order to reduce overcrowding of detention facilities and the risk of Ebola transmission among inmates.

59. In July, UNMEER oversaw the completion of all outstanding community-based projects funded through the Ebola Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Since the inception of the Mission, $930,000 has been disbursed from the Trust Fund for 13 projects in Guinea, $655,000 for 70 projects in Liberia and $700,000 for 46 projects in Sierra Leone. In the light of the closure of the Mission, the oversight and management of community-based projects funded through the Trust Fund were transferred to the resident coordinators in the three countries. They will continue, in conjunction with UNDP and the United Nations Office for Project Services, to implement projects until the end of 2015. In Guinea, an additional $1 million from the Trust Fund was transferred from UNMEER to UNDP to that end. In Liberia, where UNDP has taken over the management and administration of community-based projects funded through the

Trust Fund, some 70 community-based organizations have been identified to receive up to $5,000 per project.

60. As part of the transition of its operational activities to the United Nations country team in Sierra Leone, UNMEER facilitated the establishment of positions of United Nations country team field coordinator at the district level. The field coordinators will be the main focal points for the coordination of all United Nations activities in support of district-level Ebola response efforts. Members of the country team from UNICEF and WHO have already been appointed as field coordinators in Kambia, Port Loko, Tonkolili and Western Area. Field coordinators will be designated for the other districts in the coming weeks.

61. In both Guinea and Sierra Leone, UNMEER handed over all operational functions and closed its programmatic activities on 31 July and 30 June, respectively. A small substantive team remained on the ground in Sierra Leone in July to reinforce the coordination of response activities and resource mobilization in support of surge efforts. Ahead of its closure, UNMEER completed the transfer of its remaining vehicles to governmental partners, United Nations entities and non-governmental actors involved in the Ebola response.

Activities of the Special Envoy on Ebola

62. My Special Envoy continued to provide strategic leadership and guidance to the Ebola response effort, including through weekly meetings of the Global Ebola Response Coalition. In addition, he continued to conduct outreach and advocacy with Member States, civil society, the private sector, philanthropic foundations and the global media to support resource mobilization efforts. A representative of his office participated in an international conference on Africa's fight against Ebola, organized by the African Union in Malabo on 20 and 21 July. The participants adopted a statute for an African centre for disease control and prevention, which provides for the establishment of the centre in Addis Ababa and an office in each of the five regions of the African Union.

63. The Government of Belgium pledged to contribute €8 million ($8.8 million) over 2015 and 2016, the Government of Turkey $1.5 million, the Government of China $5 million and the Government of the Republic of Korea $5 million to the Ebola Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund, which is managed by my Special Envoy. As at 31 July, contributions totalling $140.7 million had been made to the Trust Fund, of which $133.6 million had been disbursed to a total of nine United Nations entities to support critical Ebola response interventions.

Building resilience and supporting recovery

Ebola recovery planning

64. I hosted an international conference on Ebola recovery on 9 and 10 July, which was organized by UNDP with support from my Special Envoy, in partnership with the Governments of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone and the African Development Bank, the African Union, the European Union and the World Bank. Its purpose was to focus international attention on the need for targeted investment in those three countries to support recovery priorities over a 24-month time frame and to mobilize funding to meet those needs. An estimated $5.2 billion in pledges was recorded, comprising an estimated $3.47 billion announced on 10 July and $1.79 billion in

resources previously committed. The United Nations, in close cooperation with the affected countries and the Mano River Union, will continue to work with donors to obtain the disbursement of the pledged funds to Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs facilitated the participation of key international and national non-governmental organizations active in the Ebola response in the three affected countries in the technical thematic sessions.

Non-Ebola health care

65. Throughout the response, the national Governments, UNICEF, WHO and partners have undertaken vaccination campaigns for children and revitalized maternal, infant and child health-care services. In Liberia, countrywide measles and polio campaigns were completed and more than 600,000 children between 6 and 59 months of age received vitamin A. In Guinea, as a result of nationwide UNICEF-sponsored health and vaccination campaigns, nearly 1.5 million children received vitamin A supplements and almost 1.3 million received deworming treatments. In preparation for a meningitis campaign in Guinea in August, 40 civil society representatives were trained on immunization-related communication and social mobilization strategies. At the end of July, UNICEF handed over 19 ambulances, 15 motorcycle ambulances and 122 motorcycles, together with hundreds of medical kits, to health facilities, including 450 health-care centres and 1,300 health posts.

66. In Sierra Leone, a maternal and child health care week, an integrated measles, polio and routine defaulter tracing campaign and a house-to-house polio and birth registration campaign were completed. UNICEF supported the Ministry of Health and Sanitation and the 13 district health management teams with the organization of on-the-job training, coaching and mentoring for 165 chiefdom health supervisors to provide supportive supervision to all 1,185 peripheral health units. UNFPA is supporting the Ministry in reviving service delivery for sexual and reproductive health and rights, including through the restoration of an effective referral system in support of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence.

67. The Governments of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, with support from WHO, organized the first-ever intercountry meeting on infection prevention and control, held in Monrovia from 20 to 22 July. The participants shared their experiences of infection prevention and control and water, sanitation and hygiene practices, in addition to planning the implementation of the infection prevention and control strategies outlined in national recovery plans. Key recommendations included building national expertise, improving the procurement and supply of essential infection prevention and control materials and ensuring a comprehensive and integrated approach to infection prevention and control during the Ebola outbreak and beyond to guarantee sustainability.

68. In Guinea, WHO continued to assist the Government in training non-governmental organizations to adhere to national infection prevention and control and triage standards. In Sierra Leone, it has worked with the Ministry of Health and Sanitation to train national infection prevention and control officers and more than 2,100 health-care workers on infection prevention and control. Continuous quality improvement is promoted through weekly internal assessments of Ebola and non-Ebola health-care facilities. The Government of Liberia, together with WHO, has trained some 8,000 health-care workers in triage and isolation, blood collection, hand hygiene and waste management.

69. WHO has supported the three affected countries in the development of an essential health services situation report, which will allow countries and partners to monitor monthly progress in the safe reactivation of routine health services and the extent of population coverage. Efforts are under way to ensure alignment with countries' existing data collection systems.

70. As a member of the technical advisory board, WHO continues to assist the West African Health Organization in its efforts to establish a West African regional centre for disease control, envisaged to cover the 15 States members of the Economic Community of West African States, including Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

71. Drawing from experience acquired and lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak, WHO organized a high-level meeting on building health security beyond Ebola, held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 13 to 15 July, at which the participants focused on the priorities and action needed to strengthen health system resilience. The 200 participants from Governments, donors, technical agencies and civil society emphasized the importance of building strong health systems with critical linkages to health security. My Special Envoy addressed the participants. Going forward, WHO will focus on supporting countries to carry out joint assessments, develop, implement and test national plans and monitor implementation to assess gaps.

72. Under the auspices of an early recovery task force commissioned by WHO, efforts to support the technical requirements of each country for early recovery have brought together technical experts and associated resources to develop a prototype compendium of resources. An early recovery toolkit has been made available to WHO country offices to assist Governments in safely reactivating essential health services. It is being updated in real time as new approaches, resources and case studies emerge during the early recovery period and will be reissued at least every two months in 2015.

73. In Sierra Leone, WHO continues to assist the Government in providing routine immunizations in all districts with infection prevention and control measures in place. In Liberia, WHO supported the implementation of a national polio campaign, the preliminary results of which are expected to highlight that it reached its target population.

74. In Liberia, the national malaria control programme successfully ended early in July following the nationwide distribution of 2,195,800 long-lasting insecticidal mosquito nets. WHO and UNICEF are currently supporting the programme in devising a new national strategic plan for malaria control in the context of Ebola. At the request of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the programmes in those countries will receive specific additional technical assistance from WHO at all levels, adapted to the special needs identified during the Ebola recovery phase.

Protection

75. In Sierra Leone, the Government approved a mental health and psychosocial support strategy and guidelines for a basic services package. UNICEF provided technical support to the development of the strategy and will continue to support interventions guided by it. In July, UNICEF also trained 25 government staff in case management and child protection information management systems to build

capacity to identify and monitor Ebola-affected children. In Guinea, UNICEF and partners have trained 5,889 community leaders in child protection and psychosocial support and organized plays and recreational sessions. In addition, 714 village councils for child protection have been established. In Liberia, UNICEF has supported two mobile teams in the provision of 12,000 birth certificates to reduce the backlog in birth registration resulting from the outbreak.

76. In all three affected countries, UNFPA continued to support the relevant ministries in their efforts to tackle sexual and gender-based violence, implementing programmes offering psychosocial assistance and services to survivors of such violence. In Guinea, UNFPA has supported the capacity-building of security sector officers and the training of health-care workers with regard to preventing such violence and caring for victims.

Education

77. UNICEF and education partners continue to collaborate with the ministries responsible for education in each of the three affected countries to ensure adherence to safety protocols in schools. Across those countries, 25,500 schools have been equipped with minimum hygiene packages for Ebola prevention, benefiting 5.5 million children, and 110,000 teachers have been trained in Ebola prevention and in psychosocial support. A total of 63 radio stations continue to air learning programmes. The increase in quarantined households in July affected school-age children, although UNICEF worked with the ministries and implementing partners to provide textbooks, exercise books, copies of lesson notes and solar radios to those children to support their learning during the quarantine period and to continue radio programming.

78. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, UNICEF and partners will avail themselves of the opportunity afforded by the school holidays to continue to train teachers in Ebola prevention and psychosocial interventions.

Economic impact, livelihoods and food security

79. The national Governments, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), WFP and partners have shared the preliminary findings of household food security surveys, which indicate that 18, 14 and 43 per cent of households are food insecure in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively. In Sierra Leone, 7 per cent of the population was assessed to be severely food insecure and in need of immediate assistance.

80. In Guinea, FAO, along with national counterparts, is implementing a project funded by the World Bank to support the livelihoods of affected households. Agricultural inputs were distributed to beneficiaries and implementing partners are monitoring the planting activities. A further 3,000 affected households will be supported in five coastal prefectures through the provision of rice seeds and fertilizers under a project funded by the Africa Solidarity Trust Fund for Food Security.

81. The preliminary results of the emergency food security assessment completed jointly by FAO and the ministries responsible for agriculture in the three affected countries indicate that one of the main impacts of the outbreak was the disruption of harvesting activities, resulting in limited or no food stocks for the poorest

households. The cash crop districts of Kailahun and Kenema, the first districts in Sierra Leone affected by the Ebola outbreak and quarantine measures, which were among the most food-secure districts in the WFP comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis of 2011, are now the most food-insecure districts in the country.

82. WFP, through its emergency operation, continues to support efforts to care for the infected and contain the spread of Ebola. In Guinea, in July, it provided food assistance to 140 patients and their carers, more than 4,000 contacts and their households in Boké, Dubreka and Forécariah and in excess of 5,000 children orphaned by Ebola and their foster families. Reaching almost 300 survivors with food assistance, WFP has also begun to provide cash transfers to Ebola survivors.

83. In Liberia, following the new cases in Margibi county, WFP was requested by the Government to provide food rations to more than 2,500 people to support community self-containment efforts. In addition, it provided survivor packages, consisting of mobile phones, SIM cards and an individual 30-day food ration, to the patients discharged from the Ebola treatment unit in Monrovia. In July, WFP also reached 500 survivors and 700 children orphaned by Ebola through cash transfers.

84. In Sierra Leone, WFP is supporting communities targeted by Operation Northern Push through the provision of food assistance and will continue to do so throughout Operation Enduring Zero. In addition, it provided assistance to almost 300 patients undergoing treatment and their carers, more than 650 survivors and their households and in excess of 1,400 children orphaned by Ebola.

85. In July, WFP provided follow-up food support to some 57,000 people in former Ebola-affected areas in Guinea and Liberia. It also launched a targeted supplementary feeding programme in Guinea to provide expanded social protection support to malnourished children under 5 years of age. Through the same programme, WFP reached almost 5,000 Sierra Leonean children in July, while more than 17,000 volunteers involved in the school cleaning campaign benefited from WFP food rations. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, WFP is coordinating food deliveries alongside government-led seed distributions in an effort to mitigate the possibility of a second poor planting season in Ebola-affected areas. It has reached more than 20,000 people in Sierra Leone through such assistance. In Liberia, WFP provides logistical support to transport the seeds.

86. Also in Liberia, UNDP has completed a field assessment to draw up a list of beneficiaries under its social cash transfer project, which will target 3,000 poor, Ebola-affected and labour-constrained households in Bong county. Beneficiaries will receive nine monthly cash transfers, as well as literacy and business skills training, in accordance with guidelines established by the Government within its social protection programme.

Preventing outbreaks in non-affected countries

87. In July, experts were deployed to support preparedness activities in four priority countries in Africa: Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau and Mali. In addition, 16 WHO Ebola Preparedness Officers, including those assigned to 13 priority WHO country offices for six months, in addition to three thematic experts in infection prevention and control, coordination and health logistics, continued to support the priority countries.

88. In response to the Ebola cases in Boké prefecture, Guinea, on the border with Guinea-Bissau, WHO has further increased its direct support, including through the establishment of a national emergency operations centre and two sub-offices in Gabu and Tombali, with associated regional response teams. Noteworthy progress in July included the establishment of regular cross-border information exchanges between high-risk regions in Guinea-Bissau and Boké prefecture and enhanced community engagement through volunteers and community leaders. UNICEF continues to work with partners in community engagement, including through youth movements, the preparation of schools through the dissemination of an Ebola education protocol and related training and the training of social workers to provide psychosocial support.

89. Field and functional exercises were conducted in both Côte d'Ivoire (Moyen-Cavally region) and Mali (area around Bamako) to test procedures and capacity to respond to an introduced case of Ebola. Specific procedures tested included those relating to the detection of a case in the community or at an international point of entry, the deployment and investigation of rapid response teams, the establishment and implementation of contact tracing and case management and infection control at an Ebola treatment centre.

90. As at 31 July, 64 per cent of priority countries had implemented at least 50 per cent of the Ebola preparedness checklist, compared with 7 per cent in December 2014.

91. I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the General Assembly.

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The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 18 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical table of the violations committed by Israel during the month of July 2015 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

15-14392 (E) 180915 180915

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Annex to the identical letters dated 18 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*	*Comments*
4 July 2015	0945	Fifteen Israeli enemy soldiers carrying maps, binoculars and video cameras were observed surveying the locality of Shahl inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, opposite observation point OP2 of the Indian contingent of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).	
6 July 2015	0945 1600	Inside the occupied town of Ghajar, near the technical fence, Israeli enemy soldiers in civilian clothing set ablaze some textiles and furniture. The fire spread into Lebanese territory, threatening the residents of the area, causing significant damage to communications equipment and infrastructure of the UNIFIL Spanish contingent stationed at position (28-4) at Abbasiyah, and damaging observation cameras, camera cables and the emplacements surrounding the position. The fire also damaged observation point OP2 of the UNIFIL Indian contingent.	
	1114 1200	From inside occupied Palestinian territory, near point B12 and opposite the town of Alma al-Sha'b, an Israeli enemy bulldozer violated the Blue Line on two occasions: on the first occasion by approximately 10 metres for four minutes, and on the second occasion by approximately 10 metres for five minutes.	
	–	In the vicinity of Alma al-Sha'b, the Israeli enemy violated the Blue Line and carried out engineering work along a 100 metre stretch of land up to 13 metres inside Lebanese territory, excavating soil and removing grass and a number of trees over some 825 square metres. The enemy also removed a part of the fence leading to point B12 that had been renovated by UNIFIL forces in order to demarcate the Blue Line. Those activities continued until 8 July 2015.	
8 July 2015	1250 1300	Near point B12 and opposite the town of Alma al-Sha'b, an Israeli enemy Poclain excavator extended its boom towards Lebanese territory, violating the Blue Line by approximately one metre for some 10 minutes while it carried out excavation work near the aforementioned point.	
9 July 2015	1025	From inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, Israeli enemy soldiers trained their weapons on Lebanese territory and on a Lebanese Army patrol on the Lebanese side.	
	2105	From inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy fired two flare shells over Lebanese territory between Ra's al-Naqurah and Labbunah.	
	2120	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territory for two minutes.	

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*	*Comments*
	2320	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy vehicle directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territory for one minute.	
15 July 2015	2222	From inside occupied Palestinian territory, near the Israeli enemy Hanita *ghayn*-17 position and opposite the town of Alma al-Sha'b, three Israeli enemy soldiers directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese Army Lahlah position for two minutes before withdrawing inside the *ghayn*-17 position.	
16 July 2015	1200	Opposite the Lebanese Army Hasan 2 Gate position at Kafr Shuba, five cows crossed the line of withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territory into Lebanese territory. The cows left at 1910 hours.	
18 July 2015	1015 1045	Opposite Birkat Ba'tha'il on the outskirts of Kafr Shuba, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising 13 soldiers crossed the barbed-wire fence without crossing the line of withdrawal.	
	2140 2225	From inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, Israeli enemy forces fired six flare shells over the Israeli position in that location.	
19 July 2015	2205	From inside occupied territory, the Israeli enemy directed a green laser searchlight towards the Lebanese Army observation tower of Yarun for five seconds.	
21 July 2015	0630	On the outskirts of Kafr Shuba, near the Hasan 2 Gate and opposite position 31-4 of the UNIFIL Indian contingent, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two D9 excavators, a Merkava tank and 25 infantry soldiers crossed the technical fence into a restricted area and demolished a shack that was located some 50 metres inside Lebanese territory (the area to which Lebanon maintains a claim). At 0930 hours, the two excavators withdrew into occupied territory, where they were joined by the soldiers at 0950 hours.	
22 July 2015	1815	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Defender vehicle and two Hummer vehicles arrived opposite the Kafr Killa crossing point. Ten soldiers stepped out of the vehicles, took up combat positions and trained their weapons on Lebanese territory. One of the soldiers threw a stone at a Lebanese Army patrol. The stone struck the technical fence and did not enter Lebanese territory. At 1940 hours, the enemy patrol withdrew into occupied territory.	
29 July 2015	1010	Within occupied Palestinian territory, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle and an excavator travelled from the Jubiyah position to the dirt road adjacent to the technical fence. The excavator repaired the dirt road and its boom crossed the technical fence for 10 minutes during the earth-moving operation. At 1100 hours, the patrol withdrew into occupied territory.	
30 July 2015	1200	From inside occupied territory, opposite the Wazzani resort, 17 Israeli enemy soldiers crossed the technical fence, descended towards the Wazzani river and walked along the river without violating the Blue Line. At 1230 hours, they withdrew into occupied territory.	

Sea violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*	*Comments*
6 July 2015	0745	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011, proceeding some 480 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a 36-minute period before setting off in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.	
	0753	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011), proceeding some 390 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a 15-minute period before setting off in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.	
	0904	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011), proceeding some 460 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a 40-minute period before setting off in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.	
8 July 2015	1847	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011), proceeding some 450 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a 23-minute period before setting off in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.	
9 July 2015	2145	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 15 seconds.	
11 July 2015	2055	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 10 seconds.	
12 July 2015	0835	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011), proceeding some 150 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a four-minute period before setting off in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.	
	0932	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011), proceeding some 350 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a 31-minute period before setting off in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.	
13 July 2015	1213	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011), proceeding some 180 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a five-minute period before setting off in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.	
15 July 2015	1910	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011), proceeding some 130 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a four-minute period before setting off in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.	

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*	*Comments*
17 July 2015	2250	From inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute.	
18 July 2015	0155	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute.	
19 July 2015	2230 2245	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, an Israeli enemy military launch directed several rounds of medium weapon fire towards Lebanese territorial waters.	
20 July 2015	1834	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011), proceeding some 130 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a two-minute period before setting off in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.	
21 July 2015	0916	At 1555 hours on 24 July 2015, opposite Ra's al-Naqurah and 3,700 metres from the coast, two Israeli enemy civilian vessels and a ferry violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011), proceeding some 270 metres into Lebanese territorial waters, and carried out work below the surface of the sea. The boats then headed out to sea in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.	
24 July 2015	0115	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, an Israeli enemy military launch fired a flare over Lebanese territorial waters.	
	0125	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for two seconds.	
	0900	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011), proceeding some 240 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a three-minute period before setting off in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.	
29 July 2015	0840	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011), proceeding some 280 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a two-minute period before setting off in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.	
	2140 2340	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for four periods of 15 seconds each.	
30 July 2015	1757	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011), proceeding some 225 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a two-minute period before setting off in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.	

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*	*Comments*
	2140	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy twice directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters, the first time for 20 seconds and the second time for 15 seconds.	
	2225 2340	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters five times: the first time for 20 seconds, the second time for 10 seconds, the third and fourth times for 20 seconds and the fifth time for 15 seconds.	
31 July 2015	0003 0145	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters five times: the first time for 30 seconds, the second time for 20 seconds, the third time for 45 seconds, the fourth times for 10 seconds and the fifth time for 20 seconds.	
	0215	From inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for two minutes.	
	2115 2340	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters three times: the first and second times for 20 seconds and the third time for 25 seconds.	

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*	*Comments*
1 July 2015	0830	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2210 hours over Rumaysh.	
	1825	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0705 hours on 2 July 2015 over Kafr Killa.	
2 July 2015	0755	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2220 hours over Rumaysh.	
	2020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1135 hours on 3 July 2015 over Kafr Killa.	
3 July 2015	0520	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1600 hours over Rumaysh.	

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*	*Comments*
4 July 2015	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1300 hours over Kafr Killa.	
5 July 2015	1050	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the occupied Shab'a Farms. It circled over Rashayya, Hasbayya and the South before leaving at 1500 hours over the sea off Naqurah.	
	1355	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1545 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
	2005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0700 hours on 6 July 2015 over Alma al-Sha'b.	
6 July 2015	0655	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Hasbayya, Rashayya, the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2010 hours over Kafr Killa.	
	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1145 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
	1945	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0420 hours on 7 July 2015 over Naqurah.	
7 July 2015	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, Akkar and Tripoli before leaving at 2330 hours over Kafr Killa.	
	1125	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Riyaq, Baalbek, the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 0320 hours on 8 July 2015 over Alma al-Sha'b.	
	1250	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1400 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
8 July 2015	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1910 hours over the occupied Shab'a Farms.	
	1400	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1940 hours over Rumaysh.	
	1830	Two Israeli enemy warplanes circled over the occupied Shab'a Farms.	

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*	*Comments*
9 July 2015	0830	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the occupied Shab'a Farms. It circled over Riyaq and Kafr Killa before leaving at 0005 hours on 10 July 2015 over Kafr Shuba.	
	1000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, Bushra, Zgharta and Dinniyah before leaving at 1605 hours over Kafr Killa.	
	1500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2150 hours over Bint Jubayl.	
	1515	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1615 hours over Kafr Killa.	
10 July 2015	0010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0955 hours over Kafr Killa.	
	0410	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1450 hours over Rumaysh.	
	1000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Iqlim al-Kharrub and the North before leaving at 1600 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
	1020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Beirut. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, Beirut, and the sea off Shikka before leaving at 1405 hours over the sea off Naqurah.	
	1510	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2200 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
11 July 2015	0500	An Israeli enemy unmanned UAS Hermes 450 reconnaissance aircraft crashed in the port of Tripoli. The aircraft had been circling over the city.	
	0500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1525 hours over Rumaysh.	
	1450	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2200 hours over Rumaysh.	
	1950	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0725 hours on 12 July 2015 over Kafr Killa.	

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*	*Comments*
12 July 2015	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1400 hours over Kafr Killa.	
	0840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 2230 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
	2140	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 0620 hours on 13 July 2015 over Naqurah.	
13 July 2015	0540	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 1510 hours over Naqurah.	
	1510	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq and Zahlah before leaving at 2215 hours over Rumaysh.	
14 July 2015	0815	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1505 hours over Naqurah.	
	1435	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2020 hours over Naqurah.	
	1445	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2045 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
	1840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0715 hours on 15 July 2015 over Rumaysh.	
15 July 2015	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1115 hours over Rumaysh.	
	0920	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Juniyah. It circled over Kasrawan, Jubayl, Batrun, Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 2345 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
	1005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0530 hours on 16 July 2015 over Kafr Killa.	
16 July 2015	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1955 hours over Rumaysh.	

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*	*Comments*
	0830	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1515 hours over Naqurah.	
	1410	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1045 hours on 17 July 2015 over Naqurah.	
17 July 2014	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2300 hours over Kafr Killa.	
	0940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1730 hours over Naqurah.	
	1100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1635 hours over Rumaysh.	
18 July 2015	0055	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 0740 hours over Naqurah.	
	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1800 hours over Naqurah.	
19 July 2015	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1700 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
	1340	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2335 hours over Rumaysh.	
20 July 2015	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1945 hours over Naqurah.	
	1200	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1625 hours over Naqurah.	
21 July 2015	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1650 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1030 hours over the Shab'a Farms.	

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*	*Comments*
	1715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2250 hours over Rumaysh.	
	2010	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2105 hours over Yarun.	
	2110	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2115 hours over Naqurah.	
	2200	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0855 hours on 22 July 2015 over Kafr Killa.	
22 July 2015	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1145 hours over Kafr Killa.	
	0950	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at over 0430 hours on 23 July 2015 over Rumaysh.	
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, Hasbayya, Rashayya, the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1515 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
	1100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1240 hours over the sea off Naqurah.	
	1500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1845 hours over Kafr Killa.	
23 July 2015	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1700 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
	1100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 0525 hours on 24 July 2015 over Naqurah.	
	1105	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1900 hours over Kafr Killa.	
24 July 2015	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2210 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*	*Comments*
	1025	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1925 hours over Rumaysh.	
25 July 2015	0500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1225 hours over the sea to the west of Naqurah	
	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1205 hours over Kafr Killa.	
	2215	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, Beirut and its suburbs, Matn and Ba'abda before leaving at 0820 hours on 26 July 2015 over Naqurah.	
26 July 2015	0705	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1655 hours over Rumaysh.	
	0710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Matn and Ba'abda before leaving at 1630 hours over Naqurah.	
27 July 2015	0150	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 0650 hours over Naqurah.	
	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Kasrawan and Matn before leaving at 2300 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
	1215	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2030 hours over Rumaysh.	
28 July 2015	1000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 2235 hours over Naqurah.	
	1150	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 2005 hours over Rumaysh.	
	1250	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1450 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
29 July 2015	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Matn and Ba'abda before leaving at 1800 hours over Naqurah.	

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*	*Comments*
	1445	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and bombed the position of a Palestinian organization in Jabal al-Mu'aysirah, inside Lebanon, causing human and material damage.	
30 July 2015	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Matn and Ba'abda before leaving at 0950 hours over Naqurah.	
	0940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Iqlim al-Kharrub and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1620 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
	1005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Awkar and Tripoli before leaving at 1605 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
	1340	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 2255 hours over Naqurah.	
	1610	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea to the west of Tripoli. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1710 hours over Naqurah.	
31 July 2015	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Kasrawan and Matn before leaving at 1800 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.	
	091.	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1720 hours over Rumaysh.	

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Letter dated 26 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I enclose herewith two separate annexes recording the infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships (see annex II) during the month of July 2015. It should also be noted that Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the illegal airport of Tympou.

Furthermore, I wish to inform you that Turkey and the occupation regime illegally issued notices to airmen regarding the date of 1 July, relating to exercises of the Turkish air force.

The actions of Turkey are clearly aimed at undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status by claiming a purported airspace over the occupied territory of the Republic. Additionally, Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia flight information region via radio calls. Meanwhile, Nicosia flight information region infringements and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus continue unabated. The policy of Turkey to persistently breach international law and defy international rules and regulations puts the safety of international civil aviation at risk, has a negative impact on the stability of the region and causes difficulties for air traffic over Cyprus. On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the continuing infringements of international air traffic regulations and the violations of the national airspace and the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and appeal for their immediate cessation.

I would be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annexes as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nicholas **Emiliou**

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Annex I to the letter dated 26 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Airborne violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 July	0955-1108	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC).
	1055-1116	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1431-1605	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1525-1541	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1532-1548	Two F-4 and four F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1945-2247	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
2 July	0640-0718	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0734-1020	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1042-1345	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1350-1505	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1409-1500	Two F-4 and two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1412-1454	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1630-1655	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
3 July	1428-1600	One Mil Mi-8 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
6 July	0915-0950	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
10 July	0948-1140	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
11 July	1110-1133	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1409-1427	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1747-1825	One Mil Mi-8 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
12 July	0627-0715	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1040-1201	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1657-1750	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
13 July	1344-1513	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1410-1510	Two F-4 and two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1410-1516	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
14 July	0905-1015	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1011-1222	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
15 July	1031-1206	One Huey Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1707-1727	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1740-1800	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal airport of Tympou.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
16 July	0958-1017	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1038-1118	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1145-1203	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1210-1226	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1422-1450	Five NF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1440-1451	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1451-1502	Three NF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1640-1658	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1739-1753	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal airport of Tympou.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
17 July	1806-1842	One F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1839-1921	Seven NF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
18 July	1020-1038	One Huey Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1350-1712	One Huey Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1630-1643	One Turkish aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
19 July	1622-1640	One GLF-4 Turkish aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1810-1843	One F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1837-1916	Seven NF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
20 July	1333-1348	One A-319 Turkish aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1738-1850	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1834-1914	One F-16 and one NF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	2007-2018	One A-319 Turkish aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal airport of Tympou.
	2013-2024	One GLF-4 Turkish aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal airport of Tympou.
21 July	0600-0720	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0827-0850	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	0938-0955	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	0957-1014	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1112-1133	Eight NF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1128-1147	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal airport of Tympou.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1214-1230	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1432-1450	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1555-1615	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal airport of Tympou.
23 July	1133-1211	One Bell Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1528-1541	One Bell Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
29 July	0535-0659	One Mil Mi-8 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0728-0937	One Mil Mi-8 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
30 July	1735-1835	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	2125-2215	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
31 July	0836-1202	One Mil Mi-8 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Annex II to the letter dated 26 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

Dates	*Nature of violation*
24 June-31 July	One C-149 Turkish landing ship violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Kerynia.
16-21 July	One F-500 Turkish corvette violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
17-21 July	One S-360 Turkish submarine violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Kerynia while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
19-21 July	One F-494 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Kerynia while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
19-21 July	One P-338 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Kerynia while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
25-31 July	One SG-704 Turkish coastguard ship violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos.
29-30 July	One F-494 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
30-31 July	One C-142 Turkish landing ship violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Kerynia.

United Nations A/69/1017–S/2015/666

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
27 August 2015

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 33
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 26 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, dated 24 August 2015, regarding the deployment of Russian railway troops to the occupied Georgian territory of Abkhazia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 33, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kaha **Imnadze**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

15-14554 (E) 100915

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 26 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia regarding the deployment of Russian railway troops to the occupied Georgian territory of Abkhazia

Tbilisi, 24 August 2015

In early August 2015, the Russian occupation regime deployed railway troops to the occupied Georgian region of Abkhazia under the pretext of carrying out "restoration works" over the section of railway from Ochamchire to Enguri.

In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia would like to state that in the recent period the Russian Federation has been repeatedly undertaking provocative actions against Georgia. It is important to note that prior to the open military aggression and intervention in Georgia in August 2008, Russia illegally launched a restoration of the Abkhaz section of the Georgian railway and deployed "railway troops" to the Georgian territory, which was subsequently used effectively for the transportation of Russian troops and equipment during the military aggression.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia condemns yet another such aggressive and provocative action by Moscow and categorically demands that the occupation regime immediately stop the aforesaid illegal activities in the occupied Abkhazia region of Georgia.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia also demands that the Russian Federation comply with all fundamental principles of international law, as well as with its international commitments, including those under the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, and de-occupy the Georgian territories.

At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia calls upon the international community to duly assess the illegal policy of Russia directed against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and take measures to prevent any recurrence of the military aggression of Russia against Georgia.

United Nations A/69/1018–S/2015/674

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
31 August 2015

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General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 32
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventieth year

Letter dated 28 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a report released on 28 August 2015 on an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea held under the guidance of Kim Jong Un, First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, Chairman of its Central Military Commission, First Chairman of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (see annex).

The meeting analysed and reviewed the measures taken by the Workers' Party of Korea and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to cope with the dangerous situation, which had reached the brink-of-war stage, and noted that the DPRK initiative for the inter-Korean high-level urgent contact contributed to addressing the situation in the interests of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 32, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ja** Song Nam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

15-14738 (E) 040915

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 28 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Report of an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea

Kim Jong Un guides the enlarged meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) Central Military Commission

An enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea was held under the guidance of Kim Jong Un, First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), Chairman of its Central Military Commission, First Chairman of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA).

Present at the meeting were members of the WPK Central Military Commission, executive members of the KPA Party Committee, senior officials of the General Political Bureau, the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces, departments and sections of the General Staff of the KPA, commanding officers of all the services and corps-level units, military academies at all levels, senior officials of the organs of state security and people's security, the WPK Central Committee, the Cabinet and field of foreign affairs, and chief secretaries of the Provincial Party Committees.

The meeting analysed and reviewed the revolutionary measures taken by the WPK and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the most dangerous situation, which had reached the brink of war, and successes, experiences and lessons drawn in the course of implementing them. On that basis, it discussed important strategic tasks to bolster the national defence capability so as to make it as firm as an iron wall.

The meeting also discussed measures for recovering from the flooding that had hit Rason City, dismissed some members of the WPK Central Military Commission and appointed new ones, and dealt with an organizational matter.

Informing its participants of the details of the recent crisis, Kim Jong Un analysed and reviewed the preparations for military operations made by the frontline units which had been in a state of war and the work done in various fields in the areas where a state of semi-war had been declared, and how the north-south high-level urgent contact was made, and appreciated them.

He said that in this touch-and-go situation, the WPK displayed its art of correct leadership by steering the whole country, all the people and the service personnel, and made resolute decisions and set forth strategic policies for bringing the difficult situation under control.

All the people turned out, as human bullets and bombs, to defend the revolution, and the front and rear and the service personnel and people came out to single-mindedly protect the country with courageous actions, he said, adding that the might of the whole state and unity of all the people was something unprecedented. We protected the dignity and sovereignty of the country, the gains of

the revolution and the happiness of the people by our own efforts in the midst of the tempest of history, without anybody's support or sympathy, he noted.

He said that this time the DPRK had proposed the north-south high-level urgent contact on its own initiative and put the situation, which had been inching close to an armed conflict, under control, thereby clearing away the dark clouds of war which hung over the Korean nation, and defended peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region.

The joint press release published at the contact offered a crucial, landmark occasion for defusing the acute military tension and putting the catastrophic inter-Korean relations on the path of reconciliation and trust.

He said that the sovereignty and fundamental interests of the DPRK can never be bartered for anything and that dialogue and a peaceful climate contrary to them are meaningless.

Noting that peace restored in a situation that had reached the brink of war had by no means been achieved at the negotiating table but, rather, thanks to the tremendous military muscle, with the nuclear deterrent for self-defence, built by the great party as a pivot, and the matchless ranks single-mindedly united around the party, he emphasized that the armed forces of Songun and the single-minded unity that have grown stronger in the midst of the tempest of the times serve always as an essential guarantee of defending peace on the peninsula.

Underscoring once again the need to channel top-priority efforts into bolstering the military capability for national defence, he specified strategic tasks and ways of doing so.

Informing the meeting in detail of the flood that had recently hit Rason City, he issued to it an order of the Supreme Commander of the KPA to undertake the work of recovering from it and to complete that work before the anniversary of the founding of the party, and organized a command for the campaign.

United Nations A/69/1019

General Assembly

Distr.: General
2 September 2015

Original: English

Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 80
Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Letter dated 27 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and in accordance with General Assembly resolution 69/121 of 10 December 2014 on the consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives, I would like to draw your attention to the following.

On 16 August 2015, at 3 p.m., an armed contingent of Ansar Allah (the Houthis), led by a member of the Sana'a Police Force named Abdul Hamid Al-Ansi, stormed the main gate of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates compound in Sana'a. The armed contingent seized and occupied the compound, which contains the Embassy's main building as well as the residence of the Ambassador. Embassy staff members and security guards were ordered to leave the grounds, and Embassy-owned vehicles were moved by some members of the armed contingent to an undisclosed location. At present, the armed contingent is still occupying the Embassy compound in Sana'a.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates and the League of Arab States have strongly condemned this attack, which constitutes a flagrant violation of both customary and conventional international law as codified in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and in the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In this context, I would also like to recall that, as recently as 14 April 2015, the Security Council, in resolution 2216 (2015), reaffirmed the fundamental principle of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises along with the obligations of host Governments to take all appropriate steps to protect diplomatic and consular premises against any intrusion or damage, and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of those missions or impairment of their dignity. In this regard, we welcome the press statement issued by the President of the Security Council on 19 August 2015 that condemned the seizure of the Embassy and demanded an immediate withdrawal of all Houthi elements from the premises.

Please recycle

I would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 80.

(*Signed*) Lana **Nusseibeh**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/69/1020–S/2015/681

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
1 September 2015

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General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 64 (a)
Promotion and protection of the rights of children: promotion and protection of the rights of children

Security Council
Seventieth year

Letter dated 28 August 2015 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to submit to you the report of the workshop, "Children and Armed Conflict: Implementing Security Council resolution 1998 (2011)" (see annex), convened by the Federal Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs on 22 and 23 January 2015 in Berlin. The report reflects the views of the workshop participants.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 64 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Heiko **Thoms**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

15-14891 (E) 170915

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 28 August 2015 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Report of the workshop, Children and Armed Conflict: Implementing Security Council resolution 1998 (2011)

1. On 22 and 23 January 2015, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and the Federal Foreign Office of Germany convened a workshop on "Children and Armed Conflict: Implementing Security Council resolution 1998 (2011)", at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. The workshop brought together representatives of States Members of the United Nations, including members of the Security Council, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat of the United Nations, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the European Union and various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academic institutions, to discuss measures to strengthen the implementation of Security Council resolution 1998 (2011), and its related Guidance Note "Protect Schools and Hospitals". The workshop took place under the Chatham House Rules.

2. Security Council resolution 1998 (2011) was adopted under Germany's Presidency of the Security Council in July 2011. It added attacks on schools and hospitals, defined as a grave violation against children in armed conflict in Security Council resolution 1612 (2005), to the triggers for listing parties to conflict in the annexes of the Secretary-General's annual report on Children and Armed Conflict. The Guidance Note was jointly launched on 21 May 2014, by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, UNESCO, UNICEF and the World Health Organization (WHO). Its objective is to strengthen monitoring and reporting on attacks on schools and hospitals, related protected personnel, and on the military use of schools.

Summary

3. On the first day of the workshop, participants discussed the background of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1998 (2011) and its provisions in closed sessions. Discussions were also held on the measures required to strengthen the implementation of the resolution, including the Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflicts, and its state of endorsement by States Members of the United Nations (session I). UNICEF, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat of the United Nations and the NGO "Conflict Dynamics" presented various measures aimed at increasing the protection of schools and hospitals (session II). The last closed session of day one took the form of a discussion on the potential role of new technologies in reporting attacks on schools and hospitals (session III). Following the closed sessions, a public session was held with a broader audience, including parliamentarians, journalists and workshop participants. At that session, there was a presentation by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Ms. Leila Zerrougui, followed by a discussion panel of four experts stressing the impact of armed conflict specifically on girls. On day two of the workshop,

attendees participated in a group exercise, using the Guidance Note to practice the reporting of attacks on schools and hospitals in various case studies (session IV). In a session on specific conflict situations and respective challenges (session V), participants assessed the situation in the West Bank, southern Thailand and Nigeria. In the concluding session, the workshop findings and observations were outlined, and the steps required to strengthen the implementation of Security Council resolution 1998 (2011) were defined.

Taking stock of attacks on schools and hospitals and their military use

4. The first workshop session addressed the issue of attacks on schools and hospitals, and their military use. During this session, it was recalled that the Security Council has issued many resolutions aimed at protecting children. It was noted, however, that only if the international community works together, can children be adequately protected in armed conflicts. Participants agreed that the workshop provided an excellent opportunity to discuss the measures required to reach this common goal.

5. As a starting point, participants discussed the findings of a 2014 report called "Education Under Attack" by the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack. It was noted that from 2009 until 2013, attacks occurred in over 70 countries worldwide, more than ever previously reported. It is not clear, however, whether this was due to better monitoring, or to an increase of attacks. It was underlined that in some cases, students, teachers and schools had been targeted intentionally as a tactic of warfare. Afghanistan, Colombia, Pakistan, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Sudan are the worst-affected countries. Schools there were attacked or used for military purposes in more than 1,000 incidents between 2009 and 2013.

6. The following reasons for attacks were identified by workshop participants:

(a) Ideological reasons: Armed groups see schools as "Western", or are opposed to the education of girls. A recent example of this was last year's abduction of over 200 schoolgirls from Chibok, Nigeria, by Boko Haram;

(b) Easy targets: Schools are typically State institutions and teachers are State employees. They are targeted to undermine confidence and support in the State. Schools are easier targets than Government forces;

(c) Lack of equal access to schools: Often lack of equal access can be a trigger for violence against education facilities;

(d) Military use of schools: Occasionally schools are attacked as a military target after being used for military purposes. Often, schools are used as a military base, barracks or detention centre. Of the 30 countries profiled in the report, in 24 countries schools were being used for military purpose from 2009 to 2013.

7. Participants agreed that military use of schools and attacks on them lead to:

(a) Death and destruction: Death, injury, fear, psychological stress for students and destruction of school buildings;

(b) Limited access to education: As a result of damage, schools are forced to close and it often takes years to rebuild them;

(c) Fewer girls attend school: Owing to the risk of sexual violence, parents are particularly afraid to send their daughters to schools;

(d) Costs of repairing schools: In South Sudan, there are currently fighters occupying 48 schools. In 2011, the cost of repairing these schools was approximately $67,000 per school. This is an enormous amount in a country where resources for education are limited;

(e) Loss of opportunities: Among other things, school closures lead to a loss of opportunities for children and the economy.

8. Most participants agreed that implementing the Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict (formerly known as Lucens Guidelines) could improve the protection of students and education facilities during armed conflict. It was noted that, in its resolution 2143 (2014), the Security Council encouraged Governments to develop concrete measures to deter the use of schools by armed forces. Participants underlined that these Guidelines contain such measures, and urged States to incorporate them into their national legislation and military doctrine. The need for a declaration on safe schools, including a commitment to implement the Guidelines, was emphasized.

9. While analysing the legal dimension of the Guidelines, a number of participants underlined that these Guidelines are focused and useful. However, it was also noted that their legal implications raise some questions. This is due to a possible confusion concerning the precise boundary between binding rules of international humanitarian law and non-binding good practices in the Guidelines. While the recommendations are within the scope of human rights law, in some respects they exceed what is actually dictated by international humanitarian law in situations where it would be applicable as lex specialis. This might explain the reluctance of some States to endorse such Guidelines. It was underlined by some participants that the Guidelines are not intended to affect existing international law, but are rather perceived as a collection of best practices. A number of participants argued that the Guidelines should be implemented because they could effectively protect education facilities and students from suffering during armed conflict. As a way forward, and to alleviate the reservations of some States about the legal implications of the Guidelines, it was suggested that their political character and their focus on best practice policies should be clearly emphasized and that any impression that they represent international law as it stands, or an attempt to change international law, should be avoided.

10. With regard to the Guidelines, participants also stressed that even non-binding soft law Guidelines might have some impact on existing law. The following possible impacts were identified:

(a) Soft law might create expectations of good faith;

(b) Soft law might have an impact on the interpretation of existing international law;

(c) Soft law can become relevant in national legislation and jurisprudence (which is in fact the intended effect of the Guidelines);

(d) Soft law may also function as a catalyst for the evolution of customary international law. If a number of States consistently follow the Guidelines over a

certain period of time, and if these States develop a sense of legal obligation, there might be a change in customary international law.

How to better protect schools and hospitals

11. The second workshop session focused on concrete measures to better protect schools and hospitals. Participants examined how the military components in peacekeeping missions such as in the Sudan (United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)), South Sudan (United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)), Mali (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)), as well as civil society, can be partners in protecting schools and hospitals. The specific role of military components in peacekeeping missions in the protection of schools and hospitals encompasses:

(a) Prevention by implementing early warning and monitoring systems (the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2013 by MONUSCO);

(b) Protection by presence via active patrols around schools and building barriers (in the Sudan by UNAMID in 2012, in Darfur, South Sudan by UNMISS in July 2014, in North Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by MONUSCO in November 2014);

(c) Monitoring of grave violations and reporting information to child protection sections (MONUSCO — the Democratic Republic of the Congo).

12. Participants also evaluated the civilian components of peacekeeping operations, and emphasized the specific role of child protection advisers in the protection of schools and hospitals including:

(a) Mainstreaming and child protection training;

(b) Monitoring and reporting of grave violations (the so-called monitoring and reporting mechanism);

(c) Engaging the leadership of a mission;

(d) Entering into dialogue with parties to a conflict, especially with a view to achieving signed action plans on children and armed conflicts.

13. Participants identified various challenges that undermine the protection of schools and hospitals. These include the limited access to monitoring which directly affects the quality of the reporting, the occupation of schools by armed forces, as well as the limited dissemination of guidance (e.g., to legal advisers). The question of whether schools should be used as polling stations during conflict situations was also assessed.

14. Some of the challenges described above could be addressed by: increasing dissemination and application of the Guidance Note on Security Council resolution 1998 (2011), reviewing the Child Protection Policy of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, enhancing training for Child Protection Advisers, establishing child protection focal points (United Nations military and national armed forces), and providing briefings to the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

15. Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1998 (2011), the development of new guidance for military components has been welcomed, in particular, the United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual (UNIBAM, August 2012), the United Nations Force Headquarters Handbook (November 2014), and the Protection of Civilians: Implementing Guidelines for Military Components of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions (February 2015).

16. It was noted that the inclusion of clear language on child protection in United Nations-mandated missions is a long-standing request put forward in various prior workshops. For this, participants encouraged the use of specific language on schools and hospitals such as, "schools shall not be used by the military in their operations". Participants also pointed out that Battalion Commanders must inform conflict parties about the political consequences of specific violations of international humanitarian law.

17. There was consensus among participants that community engagement must be a priority when protecting schools. When communities realize schools deserve protection, it is much easier to ensure.

18. Participants drew attention to the overall lack of accountability for serious violations against children in armed conflict (i.e., the accountability gap). Noting the emphasis on the need for accountability in Security Council resolution 1998 (2011), in particular paragraph 11, they stressed that accountability is a means of providing a remedy, but that proper accountability mechanisms also aid prevention. This entails efforts at all levels — not only as part of international justice mechanisms — to assign responsibility, enforce laws and norms, reform systems and empower children and communities affected by armed conflict. Discussants also called for practical strategies for increased tangible accountability to be developed under all children and armed conflict accountability mechanisms, including those under the auspices of the Security Council.

19. With regard to expanding the monitoring and reporting mechanism triggers, it was agreed that it is important to bear in mind the additional costs that might be incurred by the expansion, especially as new situations may appear on the agenda.

The role of new technologies in reporting attacks on schools and hospitals

20. The third workshop session examined the role of new technologies in reporting attacks on schools and hospitals. Initially, a broad overview was presented on the increased role of new technology, and the range of its potential applications. New technologies are increasingly used in major humanitarian responses (including conflict situations), as well as in documenting human rights abuses, and in analysing patterns and trends of violence across locations and time. Different uses of new technologies that could potentially foster the monitoring and reporting of attacks, such as digital data collection, crowdsourcing data collection, crisis mapping, and remote sensing, have been introduced. The participants underlined that new technologies offer opportunities for strengthening the collection, analysis and use of information on attacks. However, it was also noted that these opportunities bring challenges and risks, such as ensuring the safety of people who collect and report data, something which also needs to be thoroughly considered.

21. Research shows that the average person spends up to 2.5 hours on digital devices every day, and over 80 per cent of that time on applications. For the

purposes of humanitarian technologies, it is important to note that much of this use can be tracked to developing countries. Between 2004 and 2015, the world has seen an increase of over 50 per cent in smartphone and Internet usage in regions such as Africa and the Middle East, while over 78 per cent of the world's mobile phone subscriptions are now to be found in developing countries.

22. As an example of how new technology can improve access to the normative framework of the Children and Armed Conflict Agenda of the Security Council, Watchlist presented the smartphone application "Children and Armed Conflict", that was developed in 2012 in cooperation with the Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein to the United Nations. The application provides international policymakers, United Nations personnel and NGOs involved in child protection with ready access to key documents and recommendations for action. For example, it compiles all Security Council thematic resolutions on children and armed conflict, identifies the relevant underlying sources of international humanitarian and human rights law, and provides examples of model language on child protection from previous Security Council resolutions. It also includes a checklist specifically aimed at Security Council members on mainstreaming child protection in Security Council resolutions, with links to examples from previous resolutions. In a section entitled "Country situation", users will find background information on violations against children in armed conflict situations. To date, the Watchlist application has had over 4,600 downloads in more than 129 countries worldwide, with the bulk of those downloads in developing countries. The Children and Armed Conflict application was among the top three finalists for the "Human Rights Tulip Award". It is currently available in English and French, and will soon be available in Arabic.

23. The session also touched upon how to deal with legal questions associated with content generated through technology. In a presentation, a legal test of information, designed to ensure that generated content can be subject to legal prosecution, was introduced. The test comprises three steps assessing the relevance, the reliability and the way in which data was analysed. The question of how children can participate in documentation and at which age it is ethical to get them involved in it was also raised.

24. Examples of civilian-created video content highlighting human rights violations was also presented. The increasing number of smartphones, and other camera devices, has led to large volumes of footage captured by a greater diversity of people, thus benefiting the comprehensive documentation of human rights abuses. The participants underlined that video footage does not replace other types of evidence, but rather acts as an important contribution to assessing conflict situations. Verification of such videos was defined as a major challenge. Promising verification tools, for example "InformaCam" developed by the NGO WITNESS and The Guardian Project, are still in the testing phase.

25. In the discussion, participants expressed their support for innovative ideas in connection with new technologies in child protection. They welcomed the Watchlist smartphone application as a good example and suggested further development of the application, in particular by increasing its usability in the field. However, despite the benefits of new forms of data collection, it was stressed that the safety of those documenting situations and collecting data is of paramount importance.

26. Difficulties regarding the verification of collected information have to be overcome so that it can be used as evidence in court. Participants noted the trade-off

that can exist between improved verification through more information on the material's source and creator and concerns regarding the security of documenters. Data technology is difficult to use in court in general as the technological foundation is often challenged. Participants underlined that the technology is still evolving. There is a good chance that weaknesses can be eliminated.

27. Participants made it clear that expanding the use of the application and other innovative technologies would require further funding. Following the example of Liechtenstein, other Member States should consider providing funds for follow-up projects. A new platform for exchange between child protection and technology communities should be created to promote dialogue and leverage expertise.

Training session based on the Guidance Note

28. The fourth session spotlighted the Guidance Note on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1998 (2011) on attacks on schools and hospitals. In the introductory remarks of the briefing, it was recalled that the Guidance Note aims to:

(a) Enhance understanding of the Security Council framework for attacks on schools and hospitals;

(b) Strengthen the monitoring and reporting of attacks, including definitions, violation categories and what information to collect;

(c) Provide tools for advocacy and dialogue, including Security Council-mandated action plans on attacks on schools and hospitals;

(d) Increase United Nations and civil society partnerships to halt, prevent and respond to attacks on schools and hospitals.

29. In the second part of the session, participants split up into groups. Each group was asked to draw from the Guidance Note and apply it to various concrete case studies, with a view to understanding the complexity of the specific violation and the practical realities for practitioners in the field. The aim was to create links between the persons implementing Security Council resolution 1998 (2011) on the ground and the actors involved in developing and strengthening the children and armed conflict mandate at the political level in the Security Council. The objective was to provide a sense of mutual understanding on the implications of Security Council provisions and guidance for persons in the field, and how challenges faced on the ground could be integrated in further deliberations on future Security Council resolutions relevant to a certain kind of violation. Throughout this exercise, groups examined the following questions: Is it a monitoring and reporting mechanism violation? If so, what information is needed? Is it a violation of international law? What is the reasoning? Would the violation be a trigger for listing? How would you approach advocacy/dialogue? Which immediate preventive and protective measures could be taken? The group exercise revealed how complex and challenging it can be to answer these questions. An interactive electronic version of the Guidance Note could therefore be a great asset to support and guide field personnel while monitoring and reporting attacks on schools and hospitals.

Specific conflict situations and respective challenges

30. The sixth workshop session highlighted the specific challenges of conflict situations in the West Bank, southern Thailand and Nigeria. During the session, participants emphasized several points:

(a) Schools present an easy target. While teachers may be seen as representing the State, children are not seen as children;

(b) Challenges remain regarding the verification and reliability of data. In Nigeria geographical imaging is a promising tool for preventing a much broader spectrum of attacks on schools. Participants called on States to refrain from obstructing United Nations agencies and NGOs in the verification of information;

(c) The monitoring and reporting mechanism has undoubtedly improved child protection, but there are still weaknesses. On the one hand, it was acknowledged that the monitoring and reporting mechanism is only a human instrument, employed by humans, and as such has its natural limits. On the other hand, participants highlighted the political limitations of the system that prevent the monitoring and reporting mechanism from realizing its full potential. The need to ensure the impartiality and neutrality of the monitoring and reporting mechanism was emphasized;

(d) Regarding the working methods in the Security Council and the Working Group, participants noted that the need for consensus makes it difficult to ensure that every situation is sufficiently considered by the Working Group.

Recommendations

Based on the discussions during the workshop, the following recommendations were made to strengthen the implementation of Security Council resolution 1998 (2001) and enhance the Children and Armed Conflict agenda:

The Security Council should, on a regular basis, invite UNESCO, UNICEF and other relevant civil society organizations to brief on attacks on education facilities and students when considering country-specific situations.

If fears that the Guidelines are aimed at changing international humanitarian law as it stands can be alleviated, States should consider endorsing the Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict (formerly known as Lucens Guidelines), while emphasizing the practical values and best practice policies of the Guidelines.

More resources should be dedicated to understanding and addressing the root causes and methods of child recruitment by armed groups, and they should be made available to organizations developing strategies for prevention purposes.

States and United Nations organizations should step up efforts to support organizations monitoring, analysing, and evaluating the risk of child recruitment in vulnerable communities (cities, villages, refugee camps and schools), particularly in areas inside or bordering territories held by extremist groups.

The Security Council, States and all other relevant institutions and organizations with a mandate related to accountability for serious violations against children in armed conflict must step up efforts to develop and implement practical

strategies for increasing tangible accountability in the areas of assigning responsibility, enforcing laws and norms, reforming systems and empowering children and communities affected by armed conflict.

States, United Nations organizations and NGOs should employ technology as an important tool in the protection of children in armed conflict situations; the focus should be on closing the gap between NGO work on technology and the work of child protection advisers in the field, who often do not have access to innovative technological tools.

States and United Nations organizations should support projects aimed at developing new innovative technologies which improve the access to and flow of information on grave violations against children. This could be achieved by enhancing the Children and Armed Conflict mobile application developed by Watchlist to support field personnel in reporting and monitoring attacks on schools and hospitals. Such projects would also contribute to strengthening the communication between United Nations missions and the Security Council.

Local communities should be involved in protecting schools. Their initiative is crucial to protecting schools.

The capabilities of child protection advisers should be strengthened by offering more training programmes, and providing more resources for collecting and analysing information on attacks against schools and hospitals.

Those drafting United Nations mission mandates must understand that specialized child protection advisers are in a better position to protect children than human rights officers. The language of United Nations mission mandates must be drafted so as to ensure that the mission's child protection components are provided with the necessary capacities, resources and training.

More resources should be provided to strengthen national accountability mechanisms, including providing investigative and prosecutorial capacities for assigning responsibility to perpetrators. It should be ensured that reintegration programmes for empowering children are provided with the necessary funding.

The international child protection community should be encouraged to meet once a year to discuss issues related to the advancement and implementation of the agenda. A more standardized and regular workshop format would also provide an opportunity for newly elected members of the Security Council to familiarize themselves with the agenda, and meet with key actors in the child protection community ahead of their Council membership.

The workshop builds on previous initiatives from May 2011, February 2013, and December 2013 when the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University, Watchlist for Children and Armed Conflict, the Federal Academy for Security Policy, and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs organized, in varying formations, workshops on the Children and Armed Conflict Agenda in Berlin and in Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America. Reports of these workshops have been published as documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council (A/67/794-S/2013/158, A/68/750-S/2014/91). Outstanding key recommendations from those workshops on the implementation and enhancement of the Children and Armed Conflict Agenda are as follows:

Recommendations to the Security Council

- Ensure an adequate child protection mandate, and request timely and sufficient child protection capacity in all relevant Security Council-authorized missions. This includes peacekeeping and special political missions, with a specific focus on monitoring and the reporting of violations, and support for action plan conclusion and implementation
- Incorporate a children and armed conflict dimension in the terms of reference and reports of all Security Council field visits
- Include violations against children as designation criteria in all relevant sanctions committees, and consider options for extending the sanction regimes to other situations of armed conflict involving violations against children
- Subject individuals responsible for such violations to sanctions, and include references to violations against children in the review of narrative summaries issued by sanctions committees
- Invite regularized briefings of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict to all relevant sanctions committees.

Recommendations to the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict

- Make better use of field visits, press conferences, and press statements by the Chair of the Working Group to draw attention to violations against children and to the work of the Working Group
- Request written feedback from all concerned parties on steps taken to implement recommendations contained in Working Group conclusions
- Consider options to increase pressure on persistent perpetrators, by reviewing the use and effectiveness of its toolkit, with a specific focus on which tools have proven or could prove most effective in inducing compliance by different types of perpetrators
- Invite briefings (in-person or via video link) from the relevant Resident Coordinator or Special Representative of the Secretary-General for a given country on the situation in relation to perpetrators, including efforts made and challenges encountered in action plan implementation and conclusion
- Transmit conclusions to the chairs of relevant sanctions committees, and to the International Criminal Court Prosecutor.

Recommendations to Member States

- Mainstream children and armed conflict within foreign ministries and related government agencies, encouraging in particular the use of bilateral diplomacy and conditionality, in development or military assistance, to spur action plan conclusion and implementation
- Establish a "group of friends" at the country level to target action plan conclusion and implementation through bilateral diplomacy
- Support efforts to strengthen national accountability mechanisms, including the development of legislation criminalizing violations against children, and

building investigative and prosecutorial capacities, as well as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes.

Recommendations to the Secretary-General

- Include children and armed conflict as a specific aspect of all country reports as requested by the Security Council in its resolutions 1460 (2003), 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), and 1998 (2011)
- Include a section on the impact of the Working Group's conclusions and recommendations in each country-specific report on the situation of children and armed conflict
- Encourage all relevant Resident Coordinators and Special Representatives to prioritize the monitoring and reporting of violations against children, and the conclusion and implementation of action plans
- Ensure timely deployment of an adequate number of child protection advisers in all relevant United Nations peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and political missions to support the monitoring and reporting of violations and action plan conclusion and implementation.

United Nations A/69/1021-S/2015/680

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Security Council

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4 September 2015
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General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda items 68 (c) and 107

Security Council
Seventieth year

Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Identical letters dated 1 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Jordan rejects the baseless allegations set out in the letter dated 25 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations (S/2015/664) and in his statement before the Security Council on 27 August 2015.

The Syrian regime's actions against its own people and its ongoing violations of international humanitarian law and human rights have created a hotbed for terrorism in Syria. The fact that such actions have continued without the perpetrators being held to account has fuelled terrorism and extremism in Syria and the region as a whole.

Over the last five years, owing to the actions and policies of the Syrian regime, millions of Syrians have been tortured, killed, starved and displaced. Now the Permanent Representative of Syria has delivered a briefing to the Security Council stating, without credibility, that his regime has been cooperating with the United Nations to improve the humanitarian situation. Yet United Nations reports have demonstrated that the regime is acting in bad faith and has sought to avoid its obligations by hurling accusations against those States that have proved — in deed, and not merely in word — that they are determined to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people.

Jordan reaffirms that it has consistently combated terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, whatever its source, because it is contrary to religious and moral teachings and values. Jordan also reiterates that it has unwaveringly fought against terrorism and extremism, and that all of its institutions will continue to confront terrorism comprehensively by stepping up their efforts and by coordinating and consulting with regional and international actors to consolidate security and stability in the region. Jordan condemns the Syrian regime's persistent and futile attempts to

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smear it using baseless allegations. Jordan has in fact long been a model for counter-terrorism from every point of view.

Lastly, we should like to once again call on the international community to deal firmly and swiftly with the Syrian regime in order to ensure compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014); the resolutions of the General Assembly, including resolution 69/189; and international humanitarian law and human rights principles.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 68 (c) and 107, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dina **Kawar**
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/69/1022

General Assembly

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8 September 2015

Original: English

Sixty-ninth session
Agenda items 13 (a) and 115

Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

Letter dated 2 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to resolution 69/315, entitled "Draft outcome document of the United Nations summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda" and adopted on Tuesday, 1 September 2015, under agenda item 13 (a), entitled "Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields", and agenda item 115, entitled "Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit".

In this regard, I have the further honour to transmit herewith the text of the statement I delivered during the 101st plenary meeting of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly on behalf of the member States of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, which stated the reservations and observations of the Cooperation Council member States on the outcome document entitled "Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", which will be transmitted for action to the Assembly at its seventieth session during the United Nations summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda, to be held from 25 to 27 September 2015 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 13 (a) and 115.

(*Signed*) Alya Ahmed Saif **Al-Thani**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 2 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

Statement delivered by the State of Qatar on behalf of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf on the adoption of the draft resolution on the outcome document of the United Nations summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda

1 September 2015

First of all, it gives me pleasure to speak on behalf of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) — the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Kuwait and the State of Qatar — and to thank you for convening this meeting and following up negotiations on a final document on the post-2015 development agenda which will be transmitted for action to the United Nations General Assembly at its seventieth session during the United Nations summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda, to be held from 25 to 27 September 2015.

I should also like to thank the Permanent Representatives of Ireland and Kenya, as facilitators of intergovernmental negotiations on the post-2015 development agenda, for their efforts in overseeing the negotiation process and facilitating the discussions that have lasted over two years.

In light of the importance of the post-2015 development agenda, the GCC States have taken part, along with the other partners, in all the preparatory activities. We take this opportunity to express our deepest appreciation and gratitude to all those who made active contributions to the success of the consultations and shared with us their knowledge, time and expertise.

The negotiations on the post-2015 development agenda have confirmed the importance of open dialogue and efforts to narrow the gap between positions. Even so, the consultations did reveal some differences of opinion. Our member States therefore wish to clarify their positions on a number of issues that are addressed in the outcome document.

Reservations and observations of the GCC States on the outcome document of the United Nations summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda

Paragraphs relating to women

The GCC States have striven to respect the rights of women, empower them and improve their status. They have fostered an image of women as the partners of men in all spheres of life when appropriate to their nature. They have also upheld all of the rights of women. However, we should like to put on the record the following reservation regarding anything that conflicts with the teachings of the Islamic sharia:

The member States of the Council express a reservation regarding the use of the expression "early marriage" and the criminalization thereof in the document. The criminalization provided for in international instruments is of "child marriage", which is also criminalized under our national laws. The GCC States reaffirm their respect for international instruments and their commitments under the treaties to which they are party.

Migrants

With regard to paragraph 29 of the document, relating to migrants:

The GCC States stress their sovereign right to implement any recommendations in a manner consistent with their national laws, in particular as regards the situation of foreign workers.

Health

With regard to paragraph 26 and Goal 5, relating to health:

The GCC States guarantee the right of all to health and provide reproductive health services to all their residents without discrimination. They also permit safe abortion, in case of medical need only, and follow demographic policies without reference to reproductive health rights or reproductive health services.

The member States of the Council express a reservation regarding aspects of reproductive rights that might conflict with the provisions of the Islamic sharia and regarding any reference, wheresoever it may appear, having to do with the terms "sexual rights", or "sexual health".

Inheritance

With regard to Goal 5a, relating to inheritance:

The policies and national laws of the GCC States respect all the rights of women. There are many cases in which a woman's entitlements are greater than those of a man. In that regard, GCC States apply the human right of inheritance to women within a framework that is consistent with the national laws of GCC States.

Right to water and sanitation

With regard to paragraph 7:

We are concerned at the weakness of the formulation relating to the right to water and sanitation, which does not meet aspirations with regard to the post-2015 development agenda, given that United Nations General Assembly resolution 68/157 recognizes the need to give due consideration to the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation in the elaboration of the post-2015 development agenda, in particular while defining concrete goals, targets and indicators, taking into account an approach that supports the promotion and protection of human rights.

Sustained and sustainable economic growth

With regard to paragraph 9:

The GCC States consider the provisions of paragraph 9 relating to sustainable and inclusive economic growth to be unclear. They stress that every country has the right to enjoy sustainable and inclusive economic growth and to make use of all natural resources in the air and on the ground, from rivers, lakes and groundwater to the oceans and seas, as well as the right to an enabling environment at the national and international levels for the realization of sustainable development.

Paragraph on human rights

The GCC States regret the failure to include the phrase "internationally recognized human rights", and stress that they will be committed to internationally recognized human rights wherever the expression "human rights" appears.

References in the document to gender

The GCC States would like to stress that references in the text to "gender" designate specifically male or female, and that references in the text to "family" designate a family founded on a marriage consisting of a union between a man and woman, which is the natural and fundamental unit that comprises a family and is the basic building block of society.

The family

The GCC States find it regrettable that the final document does not refer to the role of the family in society by addressing the rights of the family as recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As a consequence, the document contains no explicit reference to the role of the family in the realization of sustainable development.

In closing, we reiterate all of the reservations expressed above and submit them, on behalf of the Arab Group, to the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals.

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda items 36 and 50

Security Council
Seventieth year

Question of Palestine

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

Identical letters dated 8 September 2015 from the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I write to you upon instructions from President Mahmoud Abbas with regard to an issue of utmost priority for the Palestinian people and their leadership, namely, the plight of the Palestine refugees.

As conflict and upheaval continue to plague the region, the suffering of the Palestine refugees has markedly intensified, as they are among the millions of civilians that have been severely affected by the spreading instability, particularly as a result of the crisis in Syria and the spillover effect in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and elsewhere in the region. In the midst of this turmoil, Palestine refugee men, women and children have been enduring death, injury, starvation, destruction of their homes and communities, repeated displacement and dispossession, and drowning and death in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea as they have tried to escape the conflict and the human insecurity, poverty and endless suffering it has inflicted on so many innocent civilians.

The tragedy of the Palestine refugees from the Yarmouk refugee camp, in particular, reflected in shocking terms the extent of the misery being suffered by the Palestine refugees throughout Syria during the years of this crisis, with every single refugee camp impacted by the war. While it is estimated that approximately 80,000 Palestine refugees have fled Syria, seeking refuge primarily in neighbouring countries, at least 480,000 Palestine refugees remain in Syria, with more than half displaced from their refugee camps and 95 per cent in need of humanitarian assistance for their basic and daily survival. In this regard, we reiterate our gratitude to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for the valiant efforts that continue to be undertaken to provide the Palestine refugees with emergency food, shelter and medical aid, as well as

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continuity of education, despite the dangerous situation prevailing on the ground, and to reaffirm also our gratitude to the donor community for their response to this emergency and rising needs, helping to alleviate the plight of the refugees to the extent possible under these most difficult circumstances.

Such assistance, however, cannot mitigate the real dangers being faced by innocent and defenceless civilians caught in the middle of this horrific conflict. It is in this grave context that President Abbas and the Palestinian leadership have issued urgent calls to all members of the international community, in particular the United Nations, to support our efforts to bring Palestine refugees to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Rather than being forced to flee in desperation to neighbouring countries or to attempt the treacherous journey to leave the Middle East region entirely in search of safety, stability and livelihoods, the Palestine refugees should be allowed to join their brothers and sisters in their homeland, where they will be most welcomed and cared for.

Regrettably, however, Israel, the occupying Power, has callously rejected this appeal, even in the face of the grave tragedies the refugees are enduring and even in the midst of the calls from throughout the international community for countries to offer safe haven and refuge to the thousands of refugees fleeing the conflict. The Palestinian leadership is thus compelled to bring this most urgent issue to your attention once again and to appeal for any and all efforts possible to support our request and facilitate this matter. Israel's intransigence can neither be accepted nor justified as we collectively seek to uphold our responsibilities and to respond to this massive humanitarian emergency. Israel should not be allowed to prevent us from bringing our refugees to safety in their own homeland. In this regard, we stress that Israel bears a moral, political and legal responsibility for the plight of the Palestine refugees and the grave injustices they have borne since they were forcibly uprooted from their homes in the 1948 *Nakba*, which continues to this day as Israel continues to prevent their return, in blatant violation of their human rights and the relevant United Nations resolutions, primarily resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948.

It is incomprehensible that for nearly seven decades the Palestine refugees have been denied their rights, foremost their right to return to their homes to live peaceably alongside their neighbours, and have suffered repeated crises, displacement, dispossession and tragedies as they have patiently awaited a just solution. While we continue to seek that just solution, in accordance with resolution 194 (III) and the Arab Peace Initiative and in the context of a just, comprehensive and lasting solution to the question of Palestine as a whole, we call on the international community to help us to spare the Palestine refugees more undue suffering and to support the effort to bring the Palestine refugees fleeing the Syrian crisis to Occupied Palestine as a matter of humanitarian, moral and political urgency.

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 36 and 50 of the 69th session, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine
to the United Nations

United Nations A/69/1024

General Assembly

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8 September 2015
English
Original: Russian

Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 33
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Letter dated 2 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the comments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia on the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the human rights situation (see annex).

I should be grateful if these comments could be issued as a document of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly under agenda item 33.

(*Signed*) V. **Churkin**

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Annex to the letter dated 2 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Comments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia on the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the human rights situation

It is clear from reading the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the human rights situation in the "occupied territories" (the term used by Georgia to refer to two independent States — the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia) that the report is intended to misinform the international community as to the real situation of human rights in the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia. The Georgian side, as announced, will prepare such reports on a quarterly basis for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

It is also strikingly evident that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia is continuing its targeted policy of implanting in the consciousness of the international community the use of the term "occupied territories" to refer to the Republic of Abkhazia, in blatant contradiction to the actual political realities in the Republic, while pursuing the political goal of creating a negative image of both the Republic of Abkhazia and Russian-Abkhaz inter-State cooperation.

We wish to remind the Georgian side that the regime and legal provisions for a military occupation have been defined by the special international treaties adopted at the Second Hague Conference of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Protocols additional thereto. According to these international instruments, military occupation is the provisional holding of the territory of one State and the control of key government functions by the armed forces of another State. Such a territory is considered occupied when authority has in fact passed into the hands of the hostile army. Furthermore, the occupying army has the right to seize money, treasury funds and other State assets of the occupied territory.

None of the above-mentioned criteria are at all applicable to the real situation in the Republic of Abkhazia, and this is well known, not only to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, but also to the international community. Most regrettably, the Georgian side continues to make extensive use of this kind of propaganda and confusion of terms in order to tarnish the image of Abkhazia.

Another blatant fabrication included in this report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia is the deliberately inflated figure of about 430,000 for the number of refugees from Abkhazia.

According to 1989 census data, the population of Abkhazia was then 525,000 and included 240,000 ethnic Georgians. The number of people who have fled Abkhazia as a result of the conflict clearly cannot exceed that figure. In addition, some 60,000 people have been returned unilaterally by the Abkhaz side to the Gali district of Abkhazia. This is perhaps the only example in modern international practice of such a large-scale return of refugees to a zone of unresolved inter-ethnic conflict. Accordingly, the refugee count of 430,000 is false.

Much of the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia addresses the crossing of the Inguri River, and also cases of citizens detained for violating the regulations governing the crossing of the State border.

In that regard, it is surprising that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia refers in its report to data provided by the so-called Department of Justice of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia. It should be recalled that this body, which has no legitimacy and is a heavy burden on the Georgian budget, is used by the Georgian side exclusively for propaganda purposes. Moreover, the findings of this body, which is an interested party, cannot be considered a source of objective and reliable information.

In general, the examples of human rights violations referred to in the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, including those alleged to have occurred in the Gali district of the Republic of Abkhazia, are false and misleading.

As for the procedure for crossing the Georgian-Abkhaz State border at the Inguri River, it has been greatly simplified for Gali district residents. On the Abkhaz side, there are five crossing points that operate for 12 hours per day (the Inguri, Saberio/Papanrkhua, Tagiloni/Taglan, Nabakevi/Nabakia and Otobaia crossing points) and are used by tens of thousands of people every month.

The leadership of the Republic of Abkhazia is making efforts to streamline the procedure for crossing the Georgian-Abkhaz State border. According to Cabinet of Ministers Decision No. 125 of 25 September 2012 on the provisional list of documents entitling the holder to enter and exit from the Republic of Abkhazia across the State border of the Republic of Abkhazia with Georgia, Gali district residents may cross the border even with the passport of a citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. All these facts make it quite clear that Gali district residents have no problems in crossing the State border with Georgia.

As for the Russian border guards, they are in Abkhazia in accordance with the 30 April 2009 Agreement between the Republic of Abkhazia and the Russian Federation on joint efforts in protection of the State border of the Republic of Abkhazia.

In that context, I wish once again to draw the attention of the international community to the blatantly coordinated and discriminatory visa policy of the European Union and Georgia, which is designed to bring about international isolation of the citizens of the Republic of Abkhazia. This policy, which has been implemented by the Georgian authorities with the support of their partners in European Union countries, contravenes all existing norms of international human rights law. These actions not only violate the human right to freedom of movement, but are also contrary to fundamental international principles, including freedom of access to education, skilled health care, cultural and athletic activities, and many others.

One central thread in the text of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia is the notion that, allegedly, there is no conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia, but the parties in conflict are Georgia and Russia, a false notion that Georgian politicians are deliberately trying to inculcate into international public discourse in an attempt to relieve Georgia of responsibility for unleashing the bloody events in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the numerous civilian casualties.

We believe that the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia does not reflect current realities, is extremely biased and is intended to mislead the international community. This politicized document is contrary to the spirit of the Geneva discussions and may be detrimental to the long-standing efforts made by the parties and the international mediators to resolve the conflict.

United Nations A/69/1025–S/2015/692

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Security Council

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9 September 2015

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Sixty-ninth session
Items 33 and 38

Security Council
Seventieth year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 8 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, dated 31 August 2015, in connection with the so-called "elections" to the "self-governing bodies" of the puppet separatist regime, to be held in the Nagorno-Karabagh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan on 13 September 2015 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 33 and 38, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 8 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan

31 August 2015

According to press reports, the so-called "elections" to the "self-governing bodies" of the puppet separatist regime in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan will be held on 13 September 2015.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan reiterates in this regard that the separatist regime established by Armenia in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan is ultimately nothing other than the product of aggression and racial discrimination; it is under Armenia's direction and control and survives by virtue of its military, political, financial and other support, as was confirmed recently by the European Court of Human Rights in its judgement of 16 June 2015 in the case of *Chiragov and others v. Armenia*.

It is well known that Armenia unleashed the war and used force against Azerbaijan, occupied almost one fifth of its territory, including the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven adjacent districts, carried out ethnic cleansing of the seized areas by expelling about 1 million Azerbaijanis from their homes and committed other serious crimes during the conflict. The international community has consistently deplored, in the strongest terms, the use of military force against Azerbaijan and the resulting occupation of its territories, as reflected in Security Council resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993), thus rejecting any actions violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and refusing to recognize as legitimate the situation created through such actions.

The holding of the so-called "elections" is yet another clear manifestation that, by undertaking consistent measures to maintain the status quo, consolidate the results of its occupation policy and annexationist aspirations, Armenia is not genuinely interested in seeking a political settlement of the armed conflict and, instead, pursues the path of provocations and escalation.

Against the background of continuing military occupation and ethnic cleansing of the territories of Azerbaijan, this mock "election" exercise constitutes a clear violation of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the norms and principles of international law and, therefore, shall have no legal effect whatsoever.

Armenia's policy of attempted annexation of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan has no chance of succeeding. The only way to achieve a durable and lasting conflict settlement is to ensure the unconditional and complete withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from the Nagorno-Karabakh region and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan, as the Security Council demands in its above-mentioned resolutions, and the exercise by the forcibly displaced Azerbaijani population of its inalienable right to return to their homes and properties in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and adjacent districts. This conflict can be resolved only on the basis of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders. No peace settlement of the conflict can be

reached which violates the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan and is inconsistent with international law. No acquisition of territory by force shall ever be recognized by the international community as lawful. Never shall Azerbaijan reconcile with the seizure of its territories. The military occupation of the territory of Azerbaijan does not represent a solution and shall never produce a political outcome desired by Armenia.

The Republic of Azerbaijan calls on all members of the international community, in line with their obligations under international law, not to recognize as lawful the situation resulting from the occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation and take effective measures in that regard.

Armenia must drop its futile attempts to mislead its own people and the wider international community, cease its policy of annexation and ethnic cleansing, engage constructively in the conflict settlement process and comply with its international obligations.

The responsibility for the consequences of any action which the Republic of Azerbaijan may be obliged to take in connection with the continued illegal presence of the Armenian armed forces and unlawful activities in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan in order to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders will lie entirely with the Republic of Armenia.